Income inequality : empirical analysis of individual incomes in Norway; 1996-2004 by Kalcic, Maja
 Master thesis for the Master of Economic Theory and Econometrics degree  
Income Inequality 






Department of Economics 




I would like to thank my supervisor Hilde Bojer for stepping in and leading me through. For 
all the help, guidelines and constructive discussions - “hvala”.  
Furthermore, I would like to thank Helene Roshauw from NSD and Jon Epland from 
Statistics Norway for prompt responses and answers to numerous questions regarding the 
data.  
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their patience and support, my 










1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 3 
2. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY ............................................................................................ 5 
2.1. WHAT SHOULD BE EQUAL?.................................................................................. 7 
2.2. DRIVING FACTORS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY ....................................... 10 
2.3. EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY........................................................... 13 
3. INCOME INEQUALITY ................................................................................................ 15 
3.1. MEASURES OF INCOME INEQUALITY ............................................................ 17 
3.1.1. Percentile distribution........................................................................................ 19 
3.1.2. The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient....................................................... 20 
3.1.3. The General Entropy class of measures and the coefficient of variation...... 22 
3.1.4. Decomposition by income source ...................................................................... 23 
3.2. TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY ................................................................... 25 
3.2.1. OECD countries.................................................................................................. 26 
3.2.2. Norway ................................................................................................................ 28 
4. ANALYSIS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN NORWAY; 1996-2004 .................... 29 
4.1. TECHNICAL SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 30 
4.1.1. Data...................................................................................................................... 30 
4.1.2. Definitions ........................................................................................................... 31 
4.2. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME................................................................................ 32 
4.3. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME COMPONENTS .................................................. 37 
4.4. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 42 
5. REFERENCE LIST ......................................................................................................... 43 
6. LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................... 47 
APPENDIX A: RESULTS................................................................................................... 48 





Economic inequality in general and income inequality in particular have been showing 
increasing trends in the last two decades. Cornia and Kiiski (2001) showed that causes of the 
recent rise are strongly linked to neoliberal policy reforms, often referred to as the 
Washington consensus, that have been increasingly adopted in industrialized countries. Trade 
liberalization, technology issues and redistributive inefficiency are put forward as the major 
new driving factors. Rising income inequality is characterized by an increase in the capital’s 
share of total income and increased earnings inequality. Moreover, Jäntti and Sanström (2005) 
argue that there is a disproportionate increase in the income share of the richest. The same 
findings are reported in OECD economic studies by Föster and Person (2002) and Förster and 
d’Ercole (2005). They show that there is a continuous increase in the market income 
inequality despite different approaches to redistribution, which highlights the 
efficiency/equity trade-off problem. However, empirical investigations of the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth have given disparate results and, so far, no 
consensus has emerged. 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse recent changes in income inequality 
in Norway. Is income inequality rising? Where in the distribution changes occur? Are the rich 
getting richer? Which income components contribute to these changes? Has there been any 
change in the importance of different income sources?  
The analysis is based on individual, rather than household equivalent incomes. This 
choice of income unite is crucial for measuring the extent of income differences and, thereby, 
overall inequality. In addition, applying selected inequality measures (decile distribution, Gini 
coefficient and squared coefficient of variation) is supposed to shed more light on different 
parts of the income distribution. 
 The evidence is clear. Since 1996, inequality of income in Norway has been rising. 
The increase can be attributed to increased share of income accruing to the rich. For instance, 
the share of top 5% individuals in total after-tax income has increased from 16% to 19,5% in 
2004 and it is still rising. Inequality of after-tax income has, in general, been showing the 
same pattern as the inequality of “market income”. However, redistributive effects of targeted 
transfers and taxes were diminishing in the observed period. In 1996, inequality of market 
income, measured by the Gini coefficient, was reduced by 0,067 (from 0,405 to 0,338), while 
in 2004, this reduction was 0,056 (from 0,408 to 0,352). Decreasing inequality of total income 
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without capital and inequality measured by the squared coefficient of variation (SCV), put 
emphasis on the capital income. Capital’s share of the total income increased moderately, 
from 6,24% to 8,53%, but capital incomes have been highly concentrated at the top of the 
distribution (share of total capital income accruing to the top 1% has increased from 55,77% 
to 73,59%). This is evident from the relative contribution of capital incomes to overall 
inequality. Even though the Gini coefficient and the SCV show different levels of capital’s 
contribution, 21,2% and 89,31% respectively, they both show an increasing trend. Market 
income inequality and inefficient taxation of capital incomes (dual taxes) are confirmed to be 
the main causes of these recent changes. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the notion of 
economic inequality and reviews different principles of distributional justice. Driving factors 
and effects of economic inequality are described in separate sections.  
Chapter 3 focuses on income inequality and starts with conceptual problems present in 
analyses of income distribution. Income inequality measures used in the empirical analysis are 
described in more details before the last section, which gives an insight into global trends in 
income inequality, with emphasis on the recent developments in OECD countries and 
Norway.  
Chapter 4 is the empirical analysis of the individual income distribution in Norway 
from 1996 to 2004, based on the Income Distribution Survey data.1 It contains two main 
sections. In chapter 4.2., the analysis deals with inequality of total and after-tax income. 
Different concepts of income are used in order to isolate the effect of underlying variations 
due to age or occupation. Decomposition of inequality by the income sources is the topic 
investigated in chapter 4.3. It explores changes in the importance of different income sources 
and their contribution to overall inequality. All computations in the paper are done with SPSS 




                                                 
1 All data, collected and prepared by the Statistics Norway (SSB), were supplied to me by the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services (NSD) in the anonymous form. Neither SSB nor NSD are in any way responsible for this 
analysis or its results. 
2 Duclos J.-Y., Araar, A. and C. Fortin, “DAD: A software for Distributive Analysis / Analyse Distributive”, 




2. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
Plato (427-347 B.C.): "The form of law which I propose would be as follows: In a state 
which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues -- not faction, but rather 
distraction -- there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty nor, again, 
excessive wealth, for both are productive of great evil . . . Now the legislator should 
determine what is to be the limit of poverty or of wealth." 
 
Economic inequality refers to disparities in the distribution of access to economic goods and 
can be assessed on three levels: national - among people within the country, international - 
between countries, and global - between all individuals in the world. National measures are 
usually the most reliable because the degree of economic inequality within country depends 
on the country’s social and economic structure.  
International comparisons are frequently used to document variations between 
countries and explain global or regional changes. Figure 1 and table B-1 (appendix B) show 
measures of national inequality for different countries. However, despite the attractiveness of 
such presentations, measures are often not directly comparable across countries due to 
different methods and type of data collected in the underlying surveys.3 
 
Figure 1: Differences in income equality measured by the national Gini coefficient4 (mid-1995) 
 
     < 0.25  
     0.25–0.29 
     0.30–0.34 
     0.35–0.39 
     0.40–0.44 
     0.45–0.49 
     0.50–0.54 
     0.55–0.59    
     ≥ 0.60 
     N/A 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality 5 
 
                                                 
3 Difficulties related to cross-time and cross-country comparisons are analysed in Atkinson et al. (2002) 
4 The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect equality and 1 corresponds to 
perfect inequality. Detailed description of inequality measures is given in chapter 3.1. 
5 Data are obtained from the UN Human Development Report 2004 
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The distribution of economic goods refers to distribution of income and wealth. The 
difference between the two is, simply put, that income represents a flow of resources over a 
period, while wealth is a stock of assets at a point in time. However, annual decisions about 
the flow of resources – income from different sources, tax, consumption, capital transfers and 
savings – affect the stock of assets (wealth), or at least its change from the last year (Atkinson, 
1983).6 This link can also explain why higher income ceteris paribus gives more wealth and 


























                                                 
6 The stock of assets is affected both by the annual flow of resources and the stock from the previous period. 
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2.1. WHAT SHOULD BE EQUAL?  
 
Inequality raises important questions about social justice and fairness in all societies. 
Different principles of justice lead to different views about inequality and there is an ongoing 
debate as to what equality should mean. There are multiple variables for judging equality and 
each variable is central in some theory. However, the acceptance of equality in terms of one 
variable can imply the rejection of equality in terms of another variable because of ‘human 
diversity’ (Sen, 1992). 
 
The distribution of economic goods can be compared to the “cake division problem”7. 
Under the assumption that the cake’s size is fixed, a particular sized slice of the cake may 
mean different levels of well-being for different people. Different innate abilities, needs, 
tastes and choices are some of the important factors that can be taken into account when 
dividing a cake. This problem of heterogeneity among individuals and the choice of relevant 
comparable characteristics are a starting point for the theory of social justice, discussed in the 
next chapter. 
But the size of the cake is variable and its division may have effect upon the size. The 
equity/efficiency trade-off problem is particularly important for issues like redistribution and 
relation between individual contributions and economic productivity. A redistribution policy 
may have costs in terms of reduced efficiency, but it may also be affected by efficiency 
considerations. An example is a policy that is considered to be a Pareto improvement if it 
makes some rich people richer without making anyone poorer, even though it increases the 
total amount of inequality. The other issue regards individuals and their differences in 
endowed productive abilities and effort. Since the effort is directly under the control of the 
individual, inequality provides incentives as long as the cause is mainly due to differences in 
behaviour. 
 
Ronald Dworkin advocates equality of resources which measure individual 
endowment, i.e. land and real capital. Inequality in distribution is accepted as just only if it is 
due to free choice (ambition sensitive), uncertainty and differences in innate abilities. 
 
                                                 
7 It refers to the allocation of a fixed resource among various individuals. (Atkinson and Bourgignon, 2000) 
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In his ‘Theory of Justice’, John Rawls introduces the concept of (social) primary 
goods - such as liberty, opportunity, income, wealth and bases of self-respect - that should be 
distributed equally. However, social and economic inequalities are allowed if ‘the difference 
principle’ is satisfied, that is if inequality is to the benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society (the so-called ‘maximin’ principle).  
Equality of capabilities is proposed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Equal 
distribution is based on equal ability to achieve relevant functionings as a part of living. 
Functionings are beings and doings that constitute the living and determine ones well-being, 
while capabilities are the real opportunities to have well-being or to achieve valuable 
functionings (Sen, 1992). It is important to distinguish capability (freedom actually enjoyed) 
from (i) primary goods and other resources (freedom to achieve) and (ii) achievements 
(combinations of functionings actually enjoyed). Full-time employment is a functioning and it 
should be a free choice of each person to achieve it or not. Still, there is a difference between 
voluntarily choosing to work part-time and being deprived of that choice. 
Welfarist theories, represented by utilitarianism and welfare economics, are concerned 
with aggregate objectives. The social welfare is evaluated by outcomes of the individual 
welfares represented in a social welfare function, ( )1 2, ,..., nW W U U U= . Optimal distribution 
of welfare, usually measured by variables that are correlated with welfare, e.g. income, is the 
distribution that maximizes social, or total, welfare. Since social welfare functions are 
normally assumed to fulfil the Pareto principle, improvements are possible either through an 
increased welfare of one person while that of the others is unchanged or a decreased 
inequality of individual welfares (in inequality averse social welfare functions). 
Marxism favours a society where distribution is based on an individual's needs rather 
than his or her ability to produce, social class, inheritance, or other such factors. In that case, 
low or non-existent inequality in income distribution assumes that everyone had the same 
"needs". 
Libertarians believe in equality under the law regardless of whether it leads to unequal 
distribution of economic goods. Inequality, being a consequence of a free market processes, is 
accepted and any pursuit of economic equality by government actions is considered as abuse 





There is also a broad disagreement between equality in terms of outcome and equality 
in terms of opportunity. The equality of outcome approach seeks to reduce or eliminate 
differences in outcome that can be measured by income, wealth, capabilities or utilities. This 
reduction can be obtained by progressive taxation or through welfare state. Equal opportunity 
approach has the intention to provide a social environment in which people are not excluded 
from the activities of society on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race, age, 
gender and disability. Greater equality of opportunity - equal consideration for employment, 
housing or education and equal access to public goods and services - means better use of basic 
human resources.8  
In practice, opportunities and outcomes are difficult to separate. Opportunities are 
often valued by measuring outcomes: equal opportunity is said to exist when people with 
similar abilities reach similar results (equality of outcome) after doing a similar amount of 
work. Moreover, opportunities that can be passed between generations through inheritance 
imply that equality of opportunity for children cannot be achieved without greater equality of 
outcome for parents. According to the UN Human Development Report 2006, parental 
income explains about 20% of the earnings of offspring in countries with low inequality (e.g. 
















                                                 
8 There would be greater efficiency and equity. (Stiglitz, 2003) 
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2.2. DRIVING FACTORS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
The causes of inequality, which are often complex and inter-related, can be explained by both 
individual characteristics and the underlying economic and social structure. 
The level of income inequality is determined by unequal distribution of income 
sources: earnings, capital and transfers. Inequality of earnings, which are the most important 
source of income, is usually explained by the differences between people (their abilities and 
opportunities), differences between jobs, and the structure of the labour market (Atkinson, 
1983). Participation and position in the labour market may significantly vary for different age, 
gender, racial and ethnic groups. This is due to both voluntary and, more often, involuntary 
choice of working time and wage rate.9 Earnings of women are still lower than those of men 
and gender inequality can be explained by both working time women choose, e.g. less 
working hours or part-time jobs, and by lower wage rates in “typically-female” professions.10 
Nevertheless, Nilsen (2007) showed that this income gap increases with the income level, 
even after controlling for characteristics such as education, experience, occupation, sector and 
working time. Earnings inequality is also affected by human capital, i.e. higher education, 
training and more experience, which usually provide better job and a higher wage rate. 
Moreover, labour market structure can influence wage formation, the structure of earnings 
and the level of (un)employment through its institutions and policies, for instance trade 
unions, collective bargaining and existence of wage regulation. 
Non-labour incomes, capital and transfers, represent a much smaller share of the total 
income. Capital income is in that sense less relevant than earnings, but its usual concentration 
at the top of the income distribution means that it can add more to overall differences. 
Transfers, on the other hand, are often considered as part of the redistribution system. 
However, the majority of transfers is based on pre-paid contributions (for case of 
unemployment, invalidity or retirement) and should not be considered as different from 
capital income (Atkinson and Bourgignon, 2000). 
 
Income inequality within many countries has increased in the last two decades. 
According to Cornia and Court (2001), this trend is characterized both by increased earnings 
inequality and increased share of capital income. 
                                                 
9 As pointed by Brandolini et al. (2002), part-time workers, young workers, women, workers in agriculture and 
less educated have larger chances of getting low-paid jobs.  
10 See Bojer (2003, 2005) 
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As showed by Cornia and Kiiski (2001), countries well endowed with natural 
resources  and with concentrated land ownership are often characterized by high income 
concentration and high earnings inequality. Natural resource-rich countries are characterized 
by capital-intensive sectors of production, which reduces demand for unskilled workers and 
increases wage differential, and by concentrated ownership in these sectors, which ensures 
high capital income only to the elite. Land concentration, on the other hand, can explain 
income inequality in agriculture-dominated economies, where land rent absorbs a large share 
of total agricultural income and depresses the rural wages and, indirectly, the minimum wage 
in the urban sector.  
Urban-rural inequalities that emerged in the post-war period through “urban bias” of 
exchange rate and pricing policies, urban-centred allocation of public expenditure and 
investment, and the urban/rural differences in access to education, can significantly contribute 
to income polarization and total inequality. Rising income inequality can be also explained by 
the unequal access to education, which increases earnings inequality. Atkinson (1983) showed 
that imperfections of capital markets and family background play an important role in 
determining access to education.  
Technological change can explain both the increased wage dispersion and decreased 
share of labour in total income. New technologies generate a higher demand for skills, the so-
called skill bias, and increase the wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. 
They also help to replace unskilled labour with skilled labour and physical capital. This is 
mostly evident in the service sector where progress in telecommunication and informational 
technologies has turned formerly non-tradeable services, like processing and accounting, into 
international tradeables (Cornia, 2003). The degree of effect that technological change has on 
inequality is closely related to investment in human capital. 
The effects of trade liberalization are usually seen as a decrease in the relative price of 
goods which are relatively unskilled-intensive (Atkinson and Bourgignon, 2000). Competition 
from countries with unskilled-intensive sectors forces industrialized countries to utilize their 
comparative advantages and expand their output in the skilled-intensive sectors. This 
increases demand for skilled labour, and hence also increases the skilled/unskilled wage 
differentials. Gourdon et al. (2006) showed that effects of trade liberalization on inequality 
are correlated with relative factor endowments, e.g. positive correlation in countries well-
endowed in highly skilled labour and capital. In addition, liberalization of financial markets 
has led to the free movement of financial capital and substantial increase in the real interest 
rates. This has increased capital’s share in the total income. 
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Changes in the labour market through liberalization policies promoting wage 
flexibility and reduced regulation were expected to generate fast employment growth and 
some increase in wage dispersion. However, Burniaux (2006) shows that labour market 
institution/policies, like bargaining power of trade unions, adequate minimum wages and 
social protection systems, helped reducing inequality in some OECD countries. According to 
Atkinson (2005), labour market institutions can explain why increased demand for skills 
resulted in increased income inequality in the US, while the European countries experienced 
increased unemployment. Moreover, increased earnings inequality due to a surge of the 
highest wages, is possibly related to the expansion of the FIIRE sector11, individual 
bargaining and changes in remuneration norms (ibid.). 
Since the 1980’s, redistribution policies have changed in most of the developed 
countries.  Deregulation and tax reforms reflect increased emphasis on economic incentives 
which can be interpreted as the outcome of an efficiency/equality trade-off. Analyses by 
Förster and Pearson (2002) and Förster and d’Ercole (2005) for OECD countries show that 
increased inequality of disposable incomes points toward lower progressivity of taxes. 
Furthermore, they claim that the level and composition of public pro-poor expenditure have 
become less redistributive. 
 To summarize, traditional causes that were responsible for high income concentration 
in the 1950s through 1970s, such as concentrated ownership of land and natural resources, 
increasing urban/regional bias and inequality in education, explains a large part of the 
variation in inequality between countries, but the evidence of rising inequality in the past two 
decades revealed new causes; shift towards skill-intensive technologies and adoption of 
policies towards domestic deregulation and external liberalization. 
 
Trends in wealth distribution have, in general, been similar to that of income. Based 
on changes in the income distribution - increasing incomes of the wealthy (relative to others) 
and increase in  capital’s share of  total income (the main income source for the wealthiest) - 
causes of increased wealth inequality can, at least partially, be explained by changes in 
income inequality.12 Rising share prices, the impact of social programs and the increasing use 
of tax avoidance measures are some of alternative causes proposed by Davies and Shorrocks 
(2000).  
 
                                                 
11 FIIRE sector includes finance, insurance, internet and real estate. 
12 Some stylized facts about wealth distribution can be found in Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and Keister (2005) 
  
13 
2.3. EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
The main practical argument in favour of reducing economic inequality is the idea that 
economic inequality weakens society, hinders social and economic development, and can 
affect social and political stability.   
 
The economic efficiency / social equity trade-off has been frequently analysed through 
relationship between inequality and growth. Traditional view based on the Kuznets-curve 
argued that levels of economic inequality are the result of stages of development. This theory, 
which showed an inverse U shape relation between inequality and income per capita, has not 
been able to explain the recent trends of increased inequality. According to Cornia and Court 
(2001), the shape of the inequality-growth relationship varies across countries depending 
upon their resource endowment, levels of absolute poverty and available stock of social 
programs, as well as on the distribution of physical and human capital. They claim that the 
Gini coefficient should be at the lower end of the efficient inequality range which is between 
0.25 (Northern European countries) and 0.40 (USA, China) in order to obtain a high growth 
rate. Figure 2 indicates that both very high egalitarianism and very high inequality cause slow 
growth. 
 
Figure 2: Inequality and growth curve 
 
Source: Cornia and Court (2001) 
 
Empirical investigations of the relationship between inequality and economic growth 
have given disparate results and, as reviewed by Asplund (2004), no consensus has emerged. 
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Moreover, recent research by Pagano (2004) shows that the sign of correlation between 
inequality and growth will be opposite for rich and poor countries. 
 
As claimed by Wilkinson (2005) in figure 3, economic inequality influences the 
quality of social relations. There is a negative correlation between inequality and social 
cohesion. In more equal societies, people are much more likely to trust each other and 
measures of social capital13 suggest greater community involvement. Lower inequality leads 
to lower crime rate and, in general, less tendencies for violence. 
 
Figure 3: How greater inequality leads to poorer social relations 
 
 
Greater income inequality 
⇓ 
Increased social distances between income groups, 
less sense of common identity 
More “them” and “us” 
⇓ 
More dominance and subordination, superiority and inferiority, 
snobbery and downward discrimination, 
hierarchical and authoritarian values 
⇓ 
Increased status competition, shift to more anti-social values, 
emphasis on self-interest and material success, carelessness of other’s welfare, 
aggressive exploitation of society for individual gain 
⇓ 
Others as rivals: poorer quality of social relations 
Source: Wilkinson (2005) 
 
Population health is also affected. Mortality is strongly associated with higher income 
inequality within levels and not per capita income (Kverndokk, 2006). The Whitehall Study 
(2004) has shown that chronic diseases (stress, heart disease, ulcers, certain types of cancer, 
etc) are more common for the lower socioeconomic status. This phenomenon is often called 
the “SES Gradient”. Lower degree of social cohesion and degraded social relations lead to 
greater levels of stress both for the poor and for the rich. However, it is the psychosocial risk 
factors, such as low social status, weak social affiliations and stress in early life, that influence 
their health (Wilkinson, 2005). 
                                                 
13 The social capital of a society concerns the institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that govern 
interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development. It includes the shared values and 
rules for social conduct expressed in personal relationships, trust and a common sense of "civic" responsibility, 
which make a society more than just a collection of individuals. (World Bank) 
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3. INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Paul Samuelson: "If we made an income pyramid out of a child's blocks, with each layer 
portraying $1,000 of income, the peak would be far higher than the Eiffel Tower, but 
almost all of us would be within a yard of the ground." 
 
‘Income’ can be defined in many ways. In general, we can distinguish between factor income, 
as defined by the production theory, and personal income.  Factor incomes refer to returns to 
different factors of production, i.e. the flow of revenue accruing to a person or nation from 
labour services and from ownership of natural resources and capital. Personal incomes are 
“resources” received by individuals and/or private households. They consist of income from 
work, capital income and transfers.  
Every analysis of income distribution faces some conceptual problems regarding 
definition of income, income unit and time period. (Atkinson, 1983) First, income definitions 
are determined by the objectives of the analysis, but also by the data available. There may 
also be more appropriate measures of access to economic resources, like wealth or 
consumption. Second, different results can be obtained based on the choice of the basic unit of 
measurement. Income inequality for households will be lower than for individuals because of 
pooling incomes and intra-family transfers. Third, ignoring life cycle effects can significantly 
overstate income inequality. Effect of age differences on inequality should be kept in mind 
when analysing annual incomes. 
 
According to Hicksian definition, income is the value of consumption which does not 
diminish wealth and income concepts correspond, accordingly, to different concepts of 
consumption. Bojer (2003) distinguishes between cash income (cash consumption), market 
income (cash income plus services from durable consumer goods), extended income (market 
income plus consumption paid for by the government, e.g. healthcare and education, and 
home production) and full income (extended income plus leisure). 
In most empirical analyses, income corresponds to market income, which is a sum of 
wages (wage rate times work time), capital income, self-employment income and income 
from pre-paid contributions (occupational pensions, unemployment and sickness benefits).14 
Disposable income is defined as the total income (market income plus social transfers) after 
deduction of taxes. 
                                                 
14 This is only partly true. Imputed rents from other durables except self-owned homes are difficult to measure 
and capital income is generally underestimated in distribution data. (Atkinson and Bourgignon, 2000)  
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The consumption based income definition is also present in defining the recipient unit. 
Income is earned by individuals, but it is often spent by households (a group of people living 
together and sharing income and consumption). It has therefore become a standard 
procedure15 to analyse the distribution of household income, i.e. the sum of individual 
incomes of the household members. To obtain a possible consumption per household 
member, a household income has to be divided by the household size which is measured by 
equivalent adult scale. Equivalence scales are usually given by formula , where n is the 
number of household members and e is the elasticity of household economies of scale and it is 
scale specific.
en
16 In this way, the concept of household income per equivalent adult assigns the 
same equivalent income to each member of the household.  
There are three different income units an analysis can be based upon: a household 
(distribution of household incomes), an individual who is a part of a household (distribution 
of household equivalent incomes) and an individual (distribution of individual incomes). 
 
Income data generally refer to a well-defined period: a week, a month or a year, and 
the choice of period will have an effect on the analysis. There are two arguments in favour of 
choosing a longer time period: age differences in the population and the sensitivity of income 
to transitory shocks. The classical life-cycle pattern predict that income increases when 
individuals enter working life, continues to rise as individuals gain experience in the labour 
market and accumulate capital assets, and declines when moving into retirement. This pattern 
can also be found for household income, where young families are compared with young 
individuals. Moreover, in the presence of perfect capital markets, annual income may be 
affected by occasional illness, unemployment or pregnancy, and still have no influence on 
consumption. 
In both cases, a lifetime income would be a better choice; but such data are difficult to 
construct (lifetime income is not known before person’s death), capital markets are not perfect 
and consumption is determined by preferences over time. And therefore, most analyses of 




                                                 
15 See income analyses by OECD, LIS (Luxemburg Income Study), Statistics Norway, Census Bureau. 
16 Another widely used set og scales is the OECD- and EU- scale which assigns 1 (1) to the first adult, 0.7 (0.5) 
to the second adult and 0.5 (0.3) to each child, respectively. 
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3.1. MEASURES OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Distribution of income has some special characteristics as presented in Atkinson and 
Bourgignon (2000). Its frequency distribution function is typically asymmetric and has a 
heavy right tail because of few, but extreme, high incomes. Most of the incomes are therefore 
concentrated around the lower end of the income range. This again implies that the median 
income17 is lower than the mean income, i.e. most people have en income lower than the 
average. 
 
In general, there are two techniques used to measure the distribution of income: 
inequality measures and concentration curves. Percentile distributions are used to compare 
one percentile to another, e.g. the share of total income between percentiles. Lorenz curve and 
Gini coefficient are used to graphically display and quantify the extent of income inequality. 
Coefficient of variation measures the relative variation independent of the mean income level. 
Atkinson’s index is a welfare-based inequality measure that quantifies the social loss involved 
in unequal income distribution in terms of shortfalls of equivalent incomes, Theil’s entropy 
index measures income inequality, based on the expected information content of the situation. 
 
Desirable properties for income inequality measures are given by following axioms: 
 The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: any income transfer from a rich person to a poor 
person should be registered as a fall (or at least not as an increase) in equality.  
 Anonymity (or symmetry): it does not matter who the high and low earners are.  
 Population independence: inequality does not change by changes in the size of the 
population.   
 Income scale independence: if each individual’s income changes by the same 
proportion, then inequality should not change.  




                                                 
17 Median income is a value that cuts off the lower 50% of units; i.e. there is an equal number of units with the 
income below and above that value. Compared with the mean, median is less affected by extreme income 
observations and therefore a better measure of the centre of the distribution. 
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Although most of the measures discussed above generally meet the set of desirable 
axioms, it is possible that they will rank the same set of distributions in different ways. As 
seen in Bojer (2003) and table B-2 in appendix B, different measures can give different, and 
even contradictory, answers because of their differing sensitivity to incomes in different parts 
of the distribution. When rankings are ambiguous, that is when underlying Lorenz curves 
intersect (explained in chapter 3.1.2.), the analysis has to be aimed towards different parts of 
the distribution. 
 
In addition to describe the distribution of incomes, analyses are often interested in 
explaining the distribution. Decomposition of inequality measures by population subgroup 
and/or by income source can show structure of the distribution and underlying patterns in 
inequality. Decomposition by groups implies division of the population into mutually 
exclusive groups, for instance by gender, age or occupational status. Both the World Bank and 
Cowell (2000) include additive decomposability - if inequality rises among each sub-group of 
the population, so should the overall inequality – as an additional axiom for inequality 
measures (Litchfield, 1999). This technique separates the overall inequality into two parts; the 
within-group and between group inequality. The only class of inequality measures that are 
additively decomposable are the generalised entropy measures.  
Decomposition by income source shows contribution of each income component to 
overall inequality. The process of decomposition is described in chapter 3.1.4. 
 
Another important property of most inequality measures is that they are ordinal (Bojer, 
2003). They can be used to compare inequalities in income distributions but they cannot 
measure differences in inequalities. However, if inequality measures are computed in a well 












3.1.1. Percentile distribution 
 
In descriptive statistics, percentiles provide estimation of proportions of the data that fall 
below and above a given value. The Pth percentile is a value such that P% of the observations 
are less than this value and that (100 − P)% are greater. For example, the 1st percentile, or P1, 
cuts off lowest 1% of data and the 99th percentile, or P99, cuts off lowest 99% (or highest 1%) 
of data.  
Most of the income distribution analysis begins by sorting the units after their 
respective income and dividing them in groups by choosing the number of fractions for 
analysis. Median, quartiles, quintiles and deciles (figure 4) divide units in two, four, five and 
ten groups respectively. All are frequently used in analysis of income distribution.18 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of after-tax household equivalent income, by deciles and time 




















Decil 10 Decil 8 Decil 5 Decil 3 Decil 1
 
Source: Statistic Norway (StatBank) 
 
Another popular measure is the decile dispersion ratio, which uses average income of 
selected deciles to measure the distance between the top and the bottom of the distribution 
(P90/P10) or the distances between these ends and the median (P90/P50 and P50/P10).19 
Even though it is easy to calculate and interpret, it ignores information about the whole 
distribution and therefore does not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. 
                                                 
18 Quartiles are used in the Income Statistics for Persons and Families 2002-2003 (2005) and deciles in the 
Income and Property Statistics for Households 2002 (2004) 
19 Some selected percentiles and percentile ratios are given in table B-2 (appendix B). 
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3.1.2. The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
 
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation based on the cumulative distribution function. 
It shows the bottom share of individuals or groups (x) and the corresponding share of total 
income ( ). As illustrated in figure 5, the Lorenz curve always starts at (0,0) and ends at 
(1,1)
( )L x
20. In the case of perfectly equal distribution (each share of individuals gets the same 




 and the Lorenz curve is the 45° line; called the line of perfect 
equality. In case of perfectly unequal distribution (one individual gets the total sum of 
incomes),  for x<1, ( ) =L x ( )1L =  and the Lorenz curve will follow the arrows in the 
figure; called the line of perfect inequality.  
 
Figure 5: The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 































line of perfect equality
line of perfect inequality
 
Source: Statistic Norway (StatBank)21 
 
In order to rank distributions by degree of inequality, we can apply the concept of 
Lorenz dominance. If the Lorenz curve of distribution 1y  lies nowhere below and at least 
somewhere above the Lorenz curve of distribution 2y , then 1y  Lorenz dominates 2y . As seen 
in figure 5, household equivalent income has become more unequal since the 1990 since the 
Lorenz curve for 1990 dominates the Lorenz curve for 2005 (dotted line).  
                                                 
20 The numeration used in figure 5 is (100%, 100%) which is equivalent to (1, 1). 
21 The same data are used for computations in figures 4 and 5. 
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The Generalized Lorenz curve which depict both the level and the inequality of 
distribution is obtained by multiplying the Lorenz curve with the mean. The dominance 
property is defined analogously. 
If one distribution Lorenz dominates the other, all inequality measure which satisfy 
anonymity and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle will rank these two distributions in the 
same way. However, if the underlying Lorenz curves cross, different inequality measures may 
give different rankings and the criterion of Lorenz dominance can no longer be used. The 
choice of measure(s) then depends on the object of interest, the part of the distribution when 
the Lorenz curves cross and on properties of different measures. 
 
The Gini coefficient is deduced from the Lorenz curve diagram. As illustrated in 
figure 5, the Gini coefficient is defined as a ratio between the area A (under the line of perfect 
equality and above the Lorenz curve) and the whole area under line of perfect equality, A+B. 
Since A+B=.5, the Gini coefficient is G=A/(A+B)=A/.5=2A=1-2B.22 One of the formulas for 
arithmetic calculation of the Gini coefficient is given by 
2
2 1rr ry nG
n nμ
+= −∑   
where the observed incomes y are ranked according to size, r is the ranking number, n is the 
number of observations (people) and μ  is the mean (income) value. Here, 0 corresponds to 
perfect income equality and 1 to perfect income inequality.23 
 
The Gini coefficient has been the most popular inequality measure. It is easy to 
calculate, it is rather intuitive due to its graphical interpretation of the Lorenz curve, and it 
gives more weights to the central part of the distribution (part with the largest number of 
observations). On the other hand, it is not additively group decomposable. Because of that, 






                                                 
22 If the Lorenz curve is represented by the function, the value of B can be found by integration. (Sydsæter, 
2003). 
23 The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage (Gini coefficient multiplied by 100). 
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3.1.3. The General Entropy class of measures and the coefficient of variation 
 
The formula for computing entropy measures is given by 









α α α μ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑  for 0,1α ≠  
where jy  is the income of person j.
24 
 
The particular entropy measure depends on the choice of the parameterα . In theory, 
this can be any real number, positive, negative or zero. But in practice, this choice is usually 
restricted by the data; α  must be strictly positive if 0 incomes occur, or an even (positive or 
negative) integer if there are negative incomes. 
The choice of α  determines how the entropy measure weights different parts of the 
distribution. If α  is large and strictly positive, high incomes will be given larger weights, 
while for negativeα , the small incomes will have the greatest influence. 
 
Entropy measures can be transformed into other inequality measures which are 
ordinally equivalent. For instance, entropy measure with 2α =  is a strictly increasing 








⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎢ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦





−= ∑  
This explains why the coefficient of variation, v, and its square value, , are 
frequently used in the income analysis. They allow both for negative or zero incomes, can 




Another transformation leads to Atkinson inequality measures which allow for 
differing attitudes to inequality. The parameter is given by 1 1α ε= − <  where ε  is the 
Atkinson parameter (the degree of inequality aversion) and has to be strictly positive. 
Atkinson measures are also interpreted as the social cost of inequality and are therefore 
cardinal. 
                                                 
24 Formulas for computing the Theil inequality measures ( )0I  and ( )0I  are given in Bojer (2003) 
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3.1.4. Decomposition by income source 
 
Income components are, as mentioned earlier, differently distributed among individuals. Each 
component’s contribution to overall inequality depends on its share of total income, 
interaction with other components and interaction with the total income. 
 
 According to Bojer (2003), the Lorenz curve can be decomposed by interaction 
curves.  An interaction curve shows a bottom share of individuals (x) and a corresponding 
share of income component i, . As with the Lorenz curve, if an income component is 
distributed equally, the interaction curve will coincide with the line of perfect equality. The 
interaction curve for transfers will typically lie above the equality line, because transfers 
accrue mainly to the lower part of the distribution of total income. On the other hand, 
interaction curve for capital incomes will lie well below the equality line, because this 
component is highly concentrated at the top of the distribution of total income. In addition, it 
usually takes negative values in its lowest range, because of negative capital incomes, or rise 
steeply in its highest range, because of high concentration at the top.  
( )il x
The Lorenz curve is a weighted sum of interaction curves  
 ( ) ( )i i
i
L x l xμμ=∑  where iμ  is the mean of the component i 
 
 Decomposition of Gini coefficient, proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984), 
combines three effects: the component share, the correlation of component with total income 
and the component distribution. It is given by 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2cov , 2cov , cov ,2 cov ,
cov ,
i i
i i i i i
i ii i i
y F y y r y r
G y r
n n y r
μ
μ μ μ μ
⎡ ⎤= = = =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑w G R  
where  is a share of source i,  is the Gini coefficient of income source i and iw iG iR  is the 
correlation of income source to overall inequality relative to correlation of income source to 
within source inequality. Relative contribution of income source i is given as 
i
i i i
Gw R w g
G
= i   
where  is the relative concentration coefficient. If , the ith source increases inequality, 







 An alternative decomposition of Gini coefficient is shown in Bojer (2003). It 
combines two effects; the component share and the effect on total income of income 
component i, given by the Gini interaction coefficient iγ . 





μ γμ μ= =∑ ∑  
 This decomposition is directly deduced from interaction curves obtained by 
decomposition of the Lorenz curve, where the Gini interaction coefficient relates to the area 
between the interaction curve and the line 1x = .  
 
Squared coefficient of variation gives a natural decomposition. In case of two income 
sources, it can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) (2 2 1 22 2 21 21 22 2 2 2 2var 2cov , 1 cov , i
i
Y Y Y
v v vμ μμ μ μ μ μ= = + + = ∑ )Y Y  for  1, 2i =
where Y is the total income and  is the total income from source i. iY
 This decomposition shows two effects: the inequality of each income component 
weighted by its share of the total income, and interaction between the two components. 
Contribution to total inequality ascribes half of the covariance term to each component, i.e. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 222 2 2cov , var cov ,iii i Y Y Y Y Yc vμμ μ μ
+= + =    for 1, 2i =  
and the relative contribution to total inequality of component i is 





















3.2. TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY  
 
After steady decline in the post-world war II period, within-country income inequality has 
been increasing over the last three decades. Cornia and Kiiski (2001) showed that inequality 
of different income concepts has risen in 48 out of 73 countries between 1960s and 1990s. 
These 48 countries (mostly developed and transitional countries) accounted for 59% of the 
population and 78% of the overall GDP-PPP.25 
In the OECD countries, this trend started in the mid-1970s and was, in general, 
attributed to an increase in capital’s share of the total income and increased earnings 
inequality. In the countries of former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, changes were closely 
related to the periods of transition in late 1980s. Limited or even negative contribution of 
capital incomes was explained by the under sampling of the high income groups and 
underreporting of capital incomes. As a result of alternating periods with fast increases and 
slow declines in income inequality, countries of Latin America have been experiencing 
increased polarization of incomes since the late 1950s. This trend accelerated further since the 
mid-1980s, leading to highly unequal distribution of land and educational opportunities. In 
China and India, inequality started to rise after the mid-1980s. In both countries these trends 
were strengthened by an increasing urban/rural gap. (ibid.) 
 
An alternative approach in explaining inequality trends, to that of calculating 
inequality measure such as Gini or the percentile ratio, is given by several analyses of the top 
of income distribution.26 After a decrease during the first half of the 20th Century, the share of 
top percentiles (top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1%) in the total income started to increase. 27 
Timing and the extent varied between countries. In both the UK and the US, the share of the 
top 1% increased from 6% and 8% in the late 1970s to 13% and almost 15% in the 1998. In 
Australia and India, it rose from 5% and 4% in the beginning of the 1980s to 9% at the end of 
the 1990s, while in France, the share of top 1% increased slightly from 7% in the mid-1980s 
to 8% in 1998. In addition, the share of earnings decreases as one moves up on the 
distribution scale, implying that the capital income is an important income source for those 
with highest incomes. 
                                                 
25 Recent estimates of inequality levels are given in table B-7 in Appendix B 
26 See Piketty (2001) for France, Piketty and Saez (2001) for the US, Atkinson (2003) for the UK, Banerjee and 
Piketty (2004) for India, and Atkinson (2007) for Australia. 
27 This is consistent with the argument given by Jäntti and Sandström (2005) who argue that the increase seems 
to have occurred mainly through a disproportionate increase in the income share of the richest fifth. 
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3.2.1. OECD countries 
 
According to Förster and Person (2002) and Förster and d’Ercole (2005),  from mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s, a significant increase is evident only for the US and the UK. From the mid-1980s 
to mid-1990s, however, there is a common trend and an increase in the Gini averaged across 
20 countries (OECD-20). Changes in the distribution of disposable household equivalent 
income, measured by Gini coefficient, are based on the same methodology and income 
definitions, as figure 6.28  In the last period, the mid-1990s to beginning or mid-2000s, the 
largest increase occurs in countries characterized by low inequality, i.e. Scandinavian 
countries and with exception of Portugal, which gives minimal effect on the average, OECD-
20, Gini.29 
 
Figure 6: Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of disposable household equivalent income  
 
Source: OECD (2005), Society at a Glance, Paris, 2005, p. 55, and Eurostat 200730 
 
Direction of changes may be different when other measures are applied. The Gini 
coefficient and the squared coefficient of variation reported in table B-3 (appendix B) indicate 
                                                 
28 For other data limitations (different surveys, comparability,etc.) see Förster and d’Ercole (2005) 
29 This corresponds to findings from analyses of the top incomes. 
30 Downloaded from http://www.cesifo.de/pls/diceguest/download/Poverty,%20Income%20Distribution/ch-
Gini-Ineq-Disp-Inc.pdf.  The CESifo Group, consisting of the Center for Economic Studies (CES), the Ifo 
Institute for Economic Research and the CESifo GmbH (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic 
Research) is a research group unique in Europe in the area of economic research. 
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opposite movements for several countries, among them the US31, and direct the analysis 
towards different parts of the distribution. Table B-4 shows that the real income32 changes 
including gains from the overall growth were, on average, in favour of those at the top of the 
distribution.  
 
The largest part of these changes has been attributed to increased inequality of market 
incomes and (in) efficiency of redistribution by taxes and transfers. As shown in table B-5 
(appendix B), the extent of redistribution and its reduction of overall inequality is much 
higher for Scandinavian and central European countries which have lower levels of market 
income inequality, between 36 and 47 per cent, than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, between 
23 and 33 percent. This low degree of redistribution in countries with high income inequality, 
that is in countries that need it the most, is often referred to as the Robin Hood paradox. 
According to Förster and Pearson (2002), increased inequality from mid-1980s to mid-
1990s that occurred mostly among the working-age population, reflects increased earnings 
inequality. Analysis was based on the working-age population (18-65 years) to avoid an 
increasing transfer share in the incomes of the entire population, and effects on inequality, 
that might simply reflect the increased share of pensioners in the population. Even though 
capital and self-employment incomes are distributed more unequally, their contribution is 
considered less relevant because their share in the total disposable income is lower. In the 
second half of the 1990s, increase in earnings inequality has been reduced, but there has been 
further widening in the distribution of capital incomes.33 If these trends continue, capital 
incomes may soon become more “relevant” component for the overall level of income 
inequality. 
Even though evidence shows an increase in earnings inequality, Burniaux et al. (2006) 
showed that gains from higher employment have, in general, offset the impact of rising 
earnings inequality and led to an increase in the share of labour incomes, and corresponding 





                                                 
31 Gini coefficient for the US estimated by LIS is 2 percent points higher than the one from OECD. This is more 
consistent with reports by the US Census Bureau where all inequality measures show the same trend (see table 
B-2 in appendix B). 
32 Disposable household equivalent incomes are deflated by the increase in the consumer price index. 





Reports from Statistics Norway34 show a steady increase of income inequality since 1986. In 
the period from 1986 to 2002, the Gini coefficient for disposable household equivalent 
income rose from 0.245 to 0.296. This trend is continuing and can be seen in figure 4, chapter 
3.1.1. While the share of the bottom decile decreased from 4.1 in 1986 to 3.6 in 2002 and 
further to 3.3 in 2005, the share of the top decile in the total disposable household equivalent 
income increased from 18.6 in 1986 to 23.6 in 2002 and to 29.5 in 2005.  Moreover, 
alternative measures are not needed since the data show Lorenz domination as seen from 
figure 5, p. 18.  
Changes in the composition of total household equivalent income are shown in figure 
7. Wages and self-employment income (dark grey), are still the most important income 
source, but their share has declined from 78% in 1986, 73% in 1998, to 69% in the 2004. 
Share of capital income (black) increased from 5% in the 1986 to almost 8% in the 2004.35 
And while the tax-free transfers (white) have been relatively stable, around 3-4%, the share of 
all transfers (white and light grey) has increased from 17% in 1986 to 22%. Moreover, both 
earnings and capital inequality has been increasing since the mid-1880s.36 
 
Figure 7: Share of each component in the total household equivalent income37 
 
Source: Statistics Norway (2007) 
                                                 
34 See Statistics Norway (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004) 
35 Introduction of taxes on share dividends explains most of the changes in capital income for 2000 and 2001. 
36 See table B-5 in Appendix B. 
37 “Yrkesinntekt” stands for earnings, “kapitalinntekt” for capital income, “skattepliktige overføringer” for 
taxable transfers (pre-paid contributions and age pensions) and ”skattefrie overføringer” for tax-free transfers 
(social security transfers), 
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4. ANALYSIS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN NORWAY; 1996-2004 
 
Empirical work on income distribution is inspired by economic welfare theory and household 
equivalent income is used as a measure of welfare. As mentioned previously, choice of 
household equivalent income instead of individual income seems reasonable when shared 
consumption and intra-household transfers are considered. Still, giving a household 
equivalent income to each person has an equalizing effect on income distribution and omitting 
intra-household inequality can significantly understate the level of inequality.38 
On one hand, individual income is a better measure of economic power and economic 
independence and, as emphasised by Bojer (2003), it measures constraints rather than welfare. 
On the other hand, it is a measure of status or of social respect and as such a part of social 
conventions.39 
 
This part of the paper analyses levels and changes in the distribution of individual 
after-tax incomes, and how different sources contribute to overall inequality. Special attention 
is given to the upper part of the income distribution, i.e. to the top decile. The analysis is 
based on annual data from the Income Distribution Survey of Norwegian households, from 














                                                 
38 Empirical evidence show underestimated inequality by at least 30%. (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990) 
39 According to Atkinson (2005), inequality can be, at least in part, socially generated. A shift in a pay norm may 
also reflect on norms that govern redistribution. 
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The Income Distribution Survey (IDS) covers the resident population, with the exception of 
certain residents of institutions. It is a sample consisting of households, and its individual 
members, that are chosen from different annual sample surveys. All sub-samples (the Level of 
Living Survey, the Household Budget Survey, the Household Panel of the Income 
Distribution Survey, EU-SILC, a special sample of self-employed, etc) included in the IDS 
have been selected according to Statistics Norway’s sample design.  
The main source of income and property data is the personal tax return obtained from 
the Directorate of Taxes. Additional data are collected from several administrative registers 
and through household interviews. 
 
As any other sample survey, the IDS is subject to a certain amount of uncertainty. To 
correct for extreme observations and sample selection bias, the whole sample is weighted. 
These weights are in addition calibrated in order to produce estimations that are identical to 
totals known from registers, e.g. age-composition in the population and incomes from work.40 
Comparison with the national account and register-based statistics (IP) shows a high degree of 
coherence for all main income components, after correcting for different definitions and 
principles used in each statistics.41  
The survey has gone through several significant changes that may have an impact on 
data comparability over time, for instance the tax reform in 1992. To be able to compare 
results, my analysis starts with 1996, when disposable income has been replaced by the after-
tax income which no longer included interest payments and housing income.42 Other relevant 






                                                 
40 Capital incomes are used in the calibration process from 2002. See Haugen (2005). 
41 See Epland (2002) 





Income from work (WSI) 
+ Wages and salaries: wages and salaries from paid employment, sickness benefits, 
maternity and adoption grants, enumerations and benefits in kind (WI) 
+ Net income from self-employment: the sum of income from self-employment and 
sickness benefits for self-employed after depreciation and deficit (SI) 
+ Capital income (CI) 
+ Gross interest received: interests on deposits in Norwegian banks and bonds (R) 
+ Share dividends received, a gross amount (SD) 
+ Net realised capital gains: gains from sales of housing, sites and other real estate, in 
addition to gains from sales of Norwegian and foreign stocks (NCG)  
+ Other capital incomes: net income from renting real estate, dividends on a life insurance 
savings part and other income from abroad (OCI) 
+ Transfers (T)44 
+ Taxable transfers: social security benefits, service pension, unemployment benefits, 
alimonies (child support until 2003) (TT) 
+ Tax-free transfers: family allowances, dwelling supports, scholarships, parent's tax 
deductions (until 2001), social assistance, maternity grant, cash for care (since 1998) 
and other transfers (TFT) 
= Total income (TI) 
-  Assessed taxes: taxes after tax deductions 
-  Negative transfers: contributions to private and public pension schemes45 
= After-tax income (ATI) 
 
Age limit for individuals included in this kind of analysis varies in the literature.46 To 
be consistent with international definitions (individuals aged below 18 are considered to be 
children), I have included only adults. In addition, this is approximately the age when 
individuals enter the labour market, or continue with higher education. Sample sizes, before 
and after selection (18+), are listed in table A-1 (Appendix A). 
                                                 
43 Classification is taken from Statistic Norway (2005) 
44 It is important to make distinction between taxable transfers (TT) and tax-free transfers (TFT). While former 
group consist of pre-paid contributions (except for minimum pensions), later group reflects targeted 
redistribution policies. 
45 Paid alimonies are excluded from 2003. 
46 It is 15+ for the US Census Bureau, 17+ for Statistics Norway and 18+ for Bojer (2003). 
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4.2. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
 
Is income inequality rising? Does the income of the rich increase the most? 
An analysis of income inequality is primarily focused on the distribution of after-tax (or 
disposable) income; it is concerned with different size of persons’ cake slices, after the market 
and the government have determined the size of the cake.  
 
The first insight into income differences may be easily obtained through the decile 
distribution, i.e. the share of total after-tax income accruing to each decile. According to the 
IDS data, distribution of after-tax income has been relatively stable except at the upper end. 
As shown in table 1, shares of lower deciles (1-4) increased slightly until the 1999. Since 
then, all middle deciles (2-9) have experienced decrease in their share of total after-tax 
income. The share of top decile, and particularly top percentiles, is the only one with clear 
increasing trend except in 2001, which can be explained by changes in the tax rules.47   
 
Table 1 Distribution of after-tax income between deciles 
Decile Top 
% share 1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 10 5 % 1 % 
ATI               
1996 1,51 % 4,23 % 12,75 % 18,47 % 23,89 % 14,51 % 24,65 % 16,02 % 6,92 %
1997 1,61 % 4,25 % 12,79 % 18,35 % 23,68 % 14,42 % 24,91 % 16,31 % 7,20 %
1998 1,72 % 4,49 % 13,13 % 18,47 % 23,61 % 14,31 % 24,28 % 15,69 % 6,41 %
1999 1,96 % 4,54 % 13,04 % 18,22 % 23,26 % 14,22 % 24,76 % 16,18 % 6,78 %
2000 1,99 % 4,51 % 12,87 % 17,81 % 22,66 % 13,79 % 26,37 % 18,02 % 8,56 %
2001 1,81 % 4,78 % 13,63 % 18,70 % 23,61 % 14,32 % 23,15 % 14,57 % 5,47 %
2002 1,55 % 4,56 % 13,02 % 17,94 % 22,77 % 13,90 % 26,26 % 17,90 % 8,75 %
2003 1,60 % 4,49 % 12,91 % 17,61 % 22,40 % 13,74 % 27,24 % 18,88 % 9,41 %
2004 1,63 % 4,48 % 12,90 % 17,54 % 22,18 % 13,53 % 27,72 % 19,55 % 10,31 %
Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
 
These results are consistent with analysis based on the after-tax household equivalent 
income in figure 4. However, choosing individual instead of household equivalent income is 
not affected by pooling incomes, and makes incomes at both end of the distribution more 
visible. Differences between these two concepts (selected deciles) are illustrated in figure 8.  
                                                 
47 Introduction of taxes on received share dividends (above the minimum tax-free amount of 10.000 NOK) has 
had significant impact on the distribution both in 2000 and 2001. After high amounts of share dividends received 
in 2000 (probably higher than usual because of forthcoming changes), in 2001 this amount was reduced by 55% 
(Statistics Norway, 2004). This has had a significant impact on the distribution of capital incomes and, as 
expected, on higher incomes where capital is a more important income source. See also next chapter. 
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Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
 
Even though decile distribution shows skewness towards the top of the distribution, it 
does not account for personal differences of people in each decile that can be a potential bias. 
It is reasonable to assume that students or pensioners are likely to be in the lower deciles and 
observed changes can simply reflect increased number of students or ageing population.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of after-tax income among different age groups and 
relative difference in income share between 1996 and 2004 (last row in the table).48 Income 
share has declined for all age groups below 45 and increased for persons in the second half of 
their life, especially for those (45-54). Share of the most elderly (80+) has been stable. 
 
Table 2 Distribution of after-tax income between age groups 
Age_group 
% share 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-66 67-79 80+ 
ATI           
1996 6,18 % 21,66 % 23,90 % 21,37 % 13,52 % 10,00 % 3,36 % 
1997 6,03 % 21,77 % 23,17 % 21,99 % 14,11 % 9,59 % 3,34 % 
1998 6,17 % 21,22 % 23,33 % 22,17 % 14,00 % 9,49 % 3,62 % 
1999 5,86 % 21,34 % 22,76 % 22,15 % 14,58 % 9,68 % 3,62 % 
2000 5,93 % 20,73 % 23,29 % 22,06 % 15,34 % 9,09 % 3,56 % 
2001 5,97 % 21,17 % 23,01 % 21,55 % 15,84 % 8,99 % 3,47 % 
2002 5,47 % 19,10 % 22,82 % 23,00 % 17,43 % 8,63 % 3,55 % 
2003 5,23 % 18,41 % 23,63 % 22,11 % 18,16 % 9,02 % 3,45 % 
2004 5,23 % 18,41 % 23,63 % 22,11 % 18,16 % 9,02 % 3,45 % 
Rel.diff 96-04 -2,48 % -4,75 % -8,56 % 2,16 % 0,51 % 0,54 % -0,02 % 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
                                                 
48 Income share of each group is weighted by its share in the population. 
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Changes in the income distribution between deciles and/or age groups affect the 
overall income inequality. In order to isolate for some of these underlying patterns, income 
inequality is measured for four different income concepts: 
- TILTFT - total income less tax-free transfers - refers to income determined through the 
participation on the market and without targeted transfers 
- TI- total income- includes both market incomes (from labour and capital) and transfers 
- ATI, after-tax income, is the income after redistribution by both taxes and transfers 
- TILC, total income less capital income  
 
Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient and its standard deviation, has 
slightly increased since the 1996 for all income concepts except the TILC. Figure 9 and table 
A-2 in appendix A show that inequality has been highest for the “market income”, TILTFT, 
where Gini increased from 0,405 to 0,408. TI includes targeted transfers and the inequality 
level has, therefore, been lower (0,382 in 1996 and 0,385 in 2004). Effect of taxes, included in 
ATI, is reflected in further reduction of inequality. However, this reduction was larger in 1996 
(0,338) than in 2004 (0,352). Inequality of TILC has been continuously decreasing, from 
0,362 to 0,340. This suggests that earnings inequality cannot explain the increasing trend in 
overall inequality. 
 











Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
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Reduced levels of inequality of TI and ATI are results of redistributive policies, i.e. 
targeted transfers and taxes. However, they all follow the same pattern implying that 
increased inequality of “market incomes”, and particularly capital incomes, is indeed the 
major cause of increased inequality of after-tax incomes. It is interesting to see that since 
2002, inequality of income without capital has been lower than that of after-tax income. This 
indicates lower progressivity of taxes on capital incomes, and points towards redistribution 
policy as the second cause of increased income inequality. 
 
 The squared coefficient of variation, in figure 10 and table A-2, shows similar results 
for income inequality. Both measures show changes in the same direction except in 2003 
when inequality of TILTFT, TI and ATI increases measured by Gini but decreases when 
measured by SCV. Even though this measure puts more weight on the upper part of the 
income distribution, inequality of TILC follows the same decreasing trend, from 0,663 in 
1996 to 0,549 in 2004. This implies that annual variations in inequality of TILTFT, TI and ATI 
reflect changes in the share of capital incomes accruing to the very rich. This is quite intuitive 
since capital incomes are highly concentrated and represent a more important source of 
income for those in the top of the income distribution.  
 


















Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
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Until 2001, different income concepts are ordered in the same way as by the Gini 
coefficient. Measured by the SCV, inequality level of TILTFT (1,031) was reduced both by 
transfers (0,938 for TI) and taxes (0,728 for ATI). However, since 2002, inequality of after-tax 
income has been increasing and in 2004 it shows more unequal distribution (8,929) than both 
TILTFT (6,129) and TI (5,678). This leads to conclusion that inequality of capital incomes is 
the major source of total inequality in the upper part of the income distribution. In addition, 
lower progressivity of taxes on capital incomes is much more evident when measured by the 
squared coefficient of variation. 
 
Tables A-3 and A-4, in appendix A, provide some additional information about effect 
of tax-free transfers, taxes and capital incomes. Decile distribution confirms that targeted 
transfers are efficient and do reduce inequality by increasing the share of lower deciles (1-6) 
in the total income. The main beneficiaries of these transfers are individuals between 18 and 
44 years, which is not surprising, since both students and young families are target groups for 
tax-free transfers. 
Effect of taxes is obvious from a decrease in shares of higher decile groups (7-10), 
where the degree of progressivity increases towards the top decile. However, after 2001, the 
top percentile has not been affected by taxes in the same way as the lower part of the top 
decile (P90-P99). Its share of total income in 2004 is lower (9,55 %) than its share of after-tax 
income (10,31 %), which implies that taxes lose their progressivity when it comes to the 
income source of the richest percentile. Since taxes show strongest impact on the income 
share of working-age groups (34-66), it is reasonable to assume that progressivity “works” for 
labour income, but not for capital income.  
Distribution of total income without capital, compared with the distribution of total 
income, shows increase in income shares for all except the top decile. This confirms previous 
assumption about different income source for the rich. Data indicate highly unequal 
distribution of capital incomes (going mostly to the top percentiles) and their increasing 
importance as the source of income since 1996. The fact that capital income, being a return to 
assets, is mostly accruing to middle-aged individuals (45-66), agrees with the life-cycle 







4.3. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME COMPONENTS 
 
Is there an increase in earnings inequality and capital’s share of the total income? 
The previous chapter indicated that earnings inequality has been stable and possibly 
decreasing, but it did not show the degree of inequality or changes in general importance of 
different income sources. Another way of explaining the overall level of inequality is to 
analyse the distribution of different income components and their share in the total income.  
 
 Occupational status is determined by the main source of income. The best way to start 
is to look at the distribution of after-tax incomes among different groups. Table 3 shows that 
the absolute share of each group has been almost constant. However, relative differences from 
1996 to 2004 (last row in the table)49 indicate increased shares for the self-employed and the 
“others”, while the employees and the pensioners experienced decrease in their share of total 
after-tax income. This suggests that the share of wages and taxable transfers (main income 
sources for employees and pensioners) in the total income has been reduced, while capital 
income (main income sources for the self-employed and “others”50) has increased. Table A-5 
in appendix A confirms that capital income is indeed mostly accruing to the self-employed 
and “others” . Moreover, “employees” is the only group whose share of income decreased 
after taxes, which may imply that taxes have different effects on labour and capital income. 
 
Table 3 Distribution of after-tax income by occupational status 
  occupational status 
% share self-employed Employees Pensioners Other 
ATI       
1996 7,25 % 68,31 % 20,86 % 3,58 %
1997 7,11 % 68,88 % 20,32 % 3,69 %
1998 6,50 % 68,50 % 21,01 % 3,99 %
1999 6,33 % 68,88 % 21,16 % 3,63 %
2000 6,49 % 69,02 % 20,50 % 4,00 %
2001 6,50 % 69,11 % 20,79 % 3,60 %
2002 6,49 % 68,79 % 20,79 % 3,94 %
2003 6,10 % 68,59 % 21,48 % 3,82 %
2004 6,75 % 66,98 % 21,68 % 4,59 %
Rel.diff 96-04 18,70 % -4,24 % -0,85 % 11,75 %
Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
 
                                                 
49 Income share of each group is weighted by its share in the population. 
50 “Others” includes individuals that are economically inactive, i.e. their income from labour is lower than the 
minimum benefit to a single pensioner from the National Insurance Scheme. (Statistics Norway, 2003) This 
implies that both students and company owners can be a part of the group. 
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 However, since most individuals receive their incomes from different sources, it is 
recommendable to look at the more relevant data before making conclusions. Figure 11 shows 
shares of each income component in total income similar to those reported for the household 
equivalent income in figure 751. Although all shares have been relatively stable in this short 
period, there have been some minor variations. Shares of wages and self-employment 
incomes have decreased from 64,8 % and 7,1 % in 1996 to 63,4 % and 6,1 % in 2004. Even 
though the share of capital income without share dividends, CLSD, has decreased, received 
share dividends contributed to the increase of capital’s share from 6,2 % to 8,5 %. The share 
of transfers has been stable at 21,9 % because the increase in the share of taxable transfers has 
been offset by the corresponding decrease in the share of tax-free-transfers. Now, it is evident 
that the share of incomes from labour in the total income is decreasing and that capital 
incomes are becoming more important source of income.  
 




















Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
 
 Importance of an income source is primarily determined by its share in the total 
income. However, its contribution to the total inequality depends also on the degree of its own 
inequality, interaction with other components and interaction with total income.  
 
                                                 
51 This should not be surprising since both analyses are based on the same data sets. However, analysis of 
individual incomes excludes the children and their contribution to, most likely, labour income. 
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The contribution of each income component to overall inequality can be assessed by 
the decomposition described in chapter 3.1.4. Again, the Gini coefficient and the squared 
coefficient of variation are used, in order to reflect changes in different parts of the income 
distribution, i.e. both around the centre and in the top end of the distribution. Based on 
previous findings, one would expect wages to be a main source of inequality around the 
centre, while capital income should account for the most of inequality at the top of 
distribution. 
Figure 12 and table A-6 in appendix A show contribution of main income components 
to total inequality measured by decomposition of the Gini coefficient. Wages and self-
employed incomes account, as expected, for the largest part of inequality, but their relative 
contribution has decreased from 93,2 % to 85,9 %.52 At the same time, contribution of capital 
incomes in general, and share dividends in particular, has been gradually increasing. Relative 
contribution of all capital incomes increased from 12,3 % to 21,1 %, whereas share dividends 
account for the increase from 4.6 % to 15,3 %. As illustrated in the figure, transfers have had 
a negative effect on total inequality, that is, they have reduced the overall inequality. Their 
relative contribution increased from -5,6 % to -7,0 %.  
 
















Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
 
                                                 
52 Inequality of wage incomes has decreased from 82,1% to 75,8% 
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 Unfortunately, the software programme used for computations (DAD) does not report 
all three elements described in chapter 3.1.4., but merely component’s share in the total 
income and its absolute coefficient of concentration. Relative coefficient of concentration 
(author’s computation from the reported data) comprises then two effects: components own 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, and its correlation with the overall inequality 
relative to correlation of component with its own inequality. 
 Relative coefficient of concentration, reported in table A-6 in appendix A, shows that 
both labour incomes and capital incomes increase inequality, i.e. . However, its values 
for self-employed and capital incomes (especially share dividends) are evidently higher than 
for wages, and rising. This must, therefore, reflect that non-labour incomes have higher 
inequality and/or higher degree of correlation with the overall inequality.  
1ig >
 
 As shown in figure 13, contribution of income components is somewhat different 
when decomposition of SCV is used. While relative contribution of wages and self-employed 
incomes decreased significantly from 39,3 % to 11 %, contribution of all capital incomes 
increased from 51,7 % to 89,3 %, and from 20,7 % to 85,6 % for share dividends alone. 
Contribution of transfers is negative also here, but their relative effect is minimal, from -1 % 
to -0,2 %.  
 

















Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
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This large contribution of capital incomes confirms, again, the high concentration of 
capital incomes at the top of the distribution. As shown in table A-7 in appendix A, DAD 
reports only absolute and relative contribution and corresponding standard deviation, while 
relative coefficient of concentration can be computed using component’s share in the total 
income. Accordingly, it is impossible to distinguish between two contribution effects: 
component’s own inequality and its interaction with other components.  
 
Additional information about the distribution of different income components is 
provided in tables A-7, A-9 and A-10 in appendix A.  
As expected, the highest share of total wages accrues to the working-age population 
(25-66) and “employees”. Data show quite unequal decile distribution, similar to that of the 
total income, which agrees with the high relative contribution of wages to overall inequality 
when measured by Gini. Moreover, the share of total wages for the upper deciles (8-10) has 
been decreasing, which can be explained with decreasing wage share in the total income, but 
also with increased importance of some other income sources. In 2004, for instance, the top 
percentile’s share is 9,55 % of total income, but only 3,17 % of total wage income.  
Self-employment and capital incomes, on the contrary, show much higher degree of 
concentration. While the “self-employed”, adults (35-54) have the largest share of total self-
employment income, capital income is mostly accruing to middle aged (35-66) “employees” 
and “pensioners”. This should not be very strange since most people receive their incomes 
from different sources. Decile distribution shows that the top decile’s share of total self-
employment income has been stable (50%), while its share of total capital income increased 
from 72,3 % in 1996 to 91,4 % in 2004. Increasing share of capital in the total income, 
therefore, benefits mostly to those in the top. For instance, more than 80% of total share 
dividends accrue to the top 1%. This explains increased contribution of capital incomes, and 
particularly share dividends, to overall inequality in the upper part of the distribution, i.e. 
when measured by SCV. 
Share of total taxable transfers is highly concentrated among the elderly (67-79) 
“pensioners”. Their negative contribution to inequality is evident from the decile distribution, 









Income inequality in Norway is increasing53 and can be explained by the 
disproportionate increase of the share of income accruing to the rich (top percentiles). 
Increased inequality of “market incomes” and inefficient taxation of capital incomes are main 
causes of increased inequality of after-tax income. Different effects taxes have on labour and 
capital income can be explained by the so-called dual income tax, which limits progressivity 
to the taxation of labour income, while capital income is taxed at the flat rate of 28 per cent, 
equal to the rate of corporate income tax. 
 
Decomposition of inequality by income sources does not show whether earnings 
inequality is rising or not. Its decreased contribution to overall inequality may simply reflect 
decreasing wage share in the total income. However, results suggest that earnings inequality 
has been constant or reduced since the 1996. On the other hand, capital’s share of the total 
income is increasing. Capital’s growing share and its high concentration among the richest 
explain increasing contribution of capital incomes to total inequality. 
 
Finally, I want to point out that all given results show inequality in absolute terms. 
According to OECD analysis, distribution of real income has been in favour of those at the 
top also in Norway. How this reflects on income inequality for different groups, and parts of 












                                                 
53 Distribution of after-tax household equivalent income for 2005 indicates further increase in inequality of after-
tax income. See Statistics Norway (2007). 
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Appendix A: Results 
 




in the IDS 
Nr of 
individuals
used Relevant observations that were excluded 
1996 37980 28457 - 
1997 39504 29580 - 
1998 38938 29153 - 
1999 26825 20004 - 
2000 34851 25693 - 
2001 70964 53740 - 
2002 59403 44279 2 obs: 849.086 and 4.063.739  (after-tax income) 
2003 44106 32455 - 























Table A-2. Inequality measures of different income concepts 
 
 TILTFT     
 Gini Std CV Std SCV 
1996 0,405  (0,005) 1,368 (0,169) 1,872 
1997 0,407  (0,004) 1,394 (0,124) 1,942 
1998 0,392  (0,003) 1,041 (0,045) 1,084 
1999 0,391  (0,004) 1,093 (0,073) 1,194 
2000 0,402  (0,004) 1,328 (0,090) 1,763 
2001 0,380  (0,003) 1,016 (0,062) 1,031 
2002 0,400  (0,005) 1,456 (0,145) 2,119 
2003 0,404  (0,004) 1,266 (0,068) 1,602 
2004 0,408  (0,008) 2,476 (0,500) 6,129 
      
 TI      
 Gini Std CV Std SCV 
1996 0,382  (0,004) 1,306 (0,163) 1,705 
1997 0,382  (0,004) 1,330 (0,120) 1,768 
1998 0,369  (0,003) 0,993 (0,044) 0,986 
1999 0,369  (0,004) 1,043 (0,071) 1,088 
2000 0,381  (0,004) 1,273 (0,087) 1,620 
2001 0,357  (0,003) 0,968 (0,067) 0,938 
2002 0,378  (0,005) 1,398 (0,141) 1,956 
2003 0,383  (0,004) 1,216 (0,066) 1,479 
2004 0,385  (0,008) 2,383 (0,484) 5,678 
      
 ATI     
 Gini Std CV Std SCV 
1996 0,338  (0,005) 1,266 (0,168) 1,604 
1997 0,338  (0,004) 1,304 (0,129) 1,700 
1998 0,326  (0,004) 0,962 (0,052) 0,925 
1999 0,327  (0,004) 1,015 (0,096) 1,030 
2000 0,338  (0,005) 1,314 (0,116) 1,727 
2001 0,311  (0,003) 0,853 (0,066) 0,728 
2002 0,342  (0,006) 1,583 (0,203) 2,505 
2003 0,349  (0,005) 1,318 (0,082) 1,738 
2004 0,352  (0,010) 2,988 (0,655) 8,929 
      
 TILC     
 Gini Std CV Std SCV 
1996 0,362  (0,002) 0,814 (0,058) 0,663 
1997 0,363  (0,003) 0,900 (0,081) 0,811 
1998 0,352  (0,002) 0,764 (0,036) 0,584 
1999 0,349  (0,003) 0,741 (0,017) 0,549 
2000 0,350  (0,002) 0,769 (0,020) 0,592 
2001 0,344  (0,002) 0,757 (0,023) 0,573 
2002 0,346  (0,002) 0,761 (0,027) 0,579 
2003 0,346  (0,002) 0,741 (0,018) 0,549 
2004 0,340  (0,002) 0,741 (0,028) 0,549 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
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Table A-3. Distribution of various income concepts, by decile, top 5% and top 1% 
decile top 
% share 1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 10 5 % 1 % 
TILTFT = TI - TFT    
1996 0,88 % 3,37 % 10,99 % 17,60 % 24,21 % 15,17 % 27,78 % 18,35 % 7,63 %
1997 1,00 % 3,29 % 10,96 % 17,41 % 24,12 % 15,15 % 28,07 % 18,63 % 7,82 %
1998 1,10 % 3,55 % 11,34 % 17,77 % 23,96 % 15,03 % 27,25 % 17,85 % 6,92 %
1999 1,29 % 3,61 % 11,37 % 17,57 % 23,62 % 14,82 % 27,72 % 18,41 % 7,31 %
2000 1,30 % 3,53 % 11,22 % 17,20 % 23,01 % 14,50 % 29,24 % 20,11 % 8,94 %
2001 1,21 % 3,79 % 11,83 % 17,88 % 23,80 % 14,92 % 26,58 % 17,19 % 6,50 %
2002 1,04 % 3,64 % 11,46 % 17,36 % 23,15 % 14,60 % 28,74 % 19,51 % 8,69 %
2003 1,06 % 3,64 % 11,40 % 17,10 % 22,78 % 14,55 % 29,46 % 20,21 % 8,96 %
2004 1,04 % 3,62 % 11,41 % 17,20 % 22,59 % 14,22 % 29,93 % 20,86 % 9,88 %
TI    
1996 1,26 % 3,55 % 11,35 % 17,72 % 24,04 % 15,03 % 27,05 % 17,75 % 7,34 %
1997 1,38 % 3,55 % 11,34 % 17,56 % 23,89 % 14,99 % 27,28 % 18,01 % 7,54 %
1998 1,49 % 3,80 % 11,66 % 17,84 % 23,78 % 14,87 % 26,55 % 17,29 % 6,67 %
1999 1,66 % 3,88 % 11,69 % 17,60 % 23,43 % 14,72 % 27,01 % 17,81 % 7,04 %
2000 1,64 % 3,76 % 11,54 % 17,29 % 22,88 % 14,39 % 28,49 % 19,48 % 8,63 %
2001 1,57 % 4,03 % 12,18 % 17,97 % 23,61 % 14,76 % 25,88 % 16,65 % 6,27 %
2002 1,38 % 3,88 % 11,80 % 17,48 % 23,01 % 14,47 % 27,99 % 18,90 % 8,40 %
2003 1,39 % 3,88 % 11,72 % 17,19 % 22,67 % 14,42 % 28,74 % 19,61 % 8,67 %
2004 1,43 % 3,85 % 11,73 % 17,21 % 22,50 % 14,15 % 29,13 % 20,19 % 9,55 %
ATI    
1996 1,51 % 4,23 % 12,75 % 18,47 % 23,89 % 14,51 % 24,65 % 16,02 % 6,92 %
1997 1,61 % 4,25 % 12,79 % 18,35 % 23,68 % 14,42 % 24,91 % 16,31 % 7,20 %
1998 1,72 % 4,49 % 13,13 % 18,47 % 23,61 % 14,31 % 24,28 % 15,69 % 6,41 %
1999 1,96 % 4,54 % 13,04 % 18,22 % 23,26 % 14,22 % 24,76 % 16,18 % 6,78 %
2000 1,99 % 4,51 % 12,87 % 17,81 % 22,66 % 13,79 % 26,37 % 18,02 % 8,56 %
2001 1,81 % 4,78 % 13,63 % 18,70 % 23,61 % 14,32 % 23,15 % 14,57 % 5,47 %
2002 1,55 % 4,56 % 13,02 % 17,94 % 22,77 % 13,90 % 26,26 % 17,90 % 8,75 %
2003 1,60 % 4,49 % 12,91 % 17,61 % 22,40 % 13,74 % 27,24 % 18,88 % 9,41 %
2004 1,63 % 4,48 % 12,90 % 17,54 % 22,18 % 13,53 % 27,72 % 19,55 % 10,31 %
TILC = TI - CI    
1996 1,37 % 3,65 % 11,68 % 18,49 % 25,13 % 15,65 % 24,04 % 14,43 % 4,12 %
1997 1,48 % 3,63 % 11,72 % 18,33 % 24,98 % 15,62 % 24,24 % 14,79 % 4,49 %
1998 1,80 % 3,88 % 11,96 % 18,41 % 24,69 % 15,35 % 23,91 % 14,47 % 4,04 %
1999 1,77 % 3,99 % 12,07 % 18,32 % 24,58 % 15,37 % 23,91 % 14,44 % 3,93 %
2000 1,74 % 3,94 % 12,17 % 18,40 % 24,40 % 15,26 % 24,08 % 14,62 % 4,00 %
2001 1,99 % 4,08 % 12,35 % 18,39 % 24,31 % 15,11 % 23,77 % 14,44 % 4,32 %
2002 1,93 % 4,06 % 12,34 % 18,45 % 24,32 % 15,23 % 23,66 % 14,17 % 3,77 %
2003 1,80 % 4,11 % 12,44 % 18,42 % 24,29 % 15,35 % 23,59 % 13,92 % 3,21 %
2004 1,85 % 4,15 % 12,63 % 18,59 % 24,25 % 15,20 % 23,33 % 13,93 % 3,58 %
 








Table A-4. Distribution of various income concepts, by age-group  
age_group 
% share 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-66 67-79 80+ 
TILTFT = TI – TFT 
1996 5,36 % 20,53 % 24,20 % 23,08 % 14,32 % 9,53 % 2,97 %
1997 5,17 % 20,87 % 23,41 % 23,70 % 14,87 % 9,06 % 2,91 %
1998 5,31 % 20,51 % 23,57 % 23,72 % 14,76 % 8,88 % 3,25 %
1999 5,06 % 20,55 % 22,91 % 23,76 % 15,36 % 9,13 % 3,23 %
2000 5,04 % 19,97 % 23,67 % 23,38 % 16,24 % 8,54 % 3,17 %
2001 5,04 % 20,32 % 23,20 % 23,13 % 16,76 % 8,46 % 3,09 %
2002 4,70 % 18,33 % 23,16 % 24,15 % 18,24 % 8,23 % 3,19 %
2003 4,47 % 17,76 % 23,88 % 23,31 % 18,97 % 8,55 % 3,06 %
2004 4,27 % 17,26 % 24,30 % 22,66 % 19,33 % 8,91 % 3,26 %
TI               
1996 5,71 % 21,21 % 24,55 % 22,52 % 13,87 % 9,23 % 2,90 %
1997 5,52 % 21,47 % 23,75 % 23,17 % 14,43 % 8,80 % 2,85 %
1998 5,67 % 21,05 % 23,92 % 23,19 % 14,35 % 8,64 % 3,18 %
1999 5,41 % 21,15 % 23,21 % 23,22 % 14,94 % 8,89 % 3,19 %
2000 5,42 % 20,55 % 23,90 % 22,88 % 15,80 % 8,34 % 3,11 %
2001 5,41 % 20,81 % 23,53 % 22,66 % 16,28 % 8,26 % 3,05 %
2002 5,03 % 18,86 % 23,49 % 23,70 % 17,76 % 8,02 % 3,15 %
2003 4,80 % 18,22 % 24,20 % 22,92 % 18,49 % 8,35 % 3,02 %
2004 4,67 % 17,71 % 24,70 % 22,26 % 18,78 % 8,67 % 3,21 %
ATI             
1996 6,18 % 21,66 % 23,90 % 21,37 % 13,52 % 10,00 % 3,36 %
1997 6,03 % 21,77 % 23,17 % 21,99 % 14,11 % 9,59 % 3,34 %
1998 6,17 % 21,22 % 23,33 % 22,17 % 14,00 % 9,49 % 3,62 %
1999 5,86 % 21,34 % 22,76 % 22,15 % 14,58 % 9,68 % 3,62 %
2000 5,93 % 20,73 % 23,29 % 22,06 % 15,34 % 9,09 % 3,56 %
2001 5,97 % 21,17 % 23,01 % 21,55 % 15,84 % 8,99 % 3,47 %
2002 5,47 % 19,10 % 22,82 % 23,00 % 17,43 % 8,63 % 3,55 %
2003 5,23 % 18,41 % 23,63 % 22,11 % 18,16 % 9,02 % 3,45 %
2004 5,23 % 18,41 % 23,63 % 22,11 % 18,16 % 9,02 % 3,45 %
TILC = TI - CI             
1996 6,03 % 21,94 % 24,73 % 22,55 % 13,20 % 8,74 % 2,81 %
1997 5,80 % 22,04 % 23,99 % 23,07 % 13,77 % 8,51 % 2,83 %
1998 5,87 % 21,86 % 24,32 % 22,81 % 13,86 % 8,27 % 3,00 %
1999 5,66 % 21,99 % 23,58 % 23,13 % 14,29 % 8,34 % 3,02 %
2000 5,81 % 21,64 % 24,33 % 22,05 % 15,02 % 8,06 % 3,09 %
2001 5,60 % 21,24 % 24,11 % 22,44 % 15,85 % 7,86 % 2,90 %
2002 5,36 % 19,91 % 24,36 % 22,66 % 16,93 % 7,75 % 3,03 %
2003 5,11 % 19,35 % 24,63 % 22,48 % 17,54 % 7,87 % 3,03 %
2004 5,01 % 18,22 % 24,69 % 22,48 % 18,26 % 8,11 % 3,23 %
 








Table A-5 Distribution of various income concepts, by occupational status  
occupational status 
% share Self-employed Employees Pensioners Other 
TILTFT = TI - TFT        
1996 7,95 % 71,75 % 18,51 % 1,79 % 
1997 7,92 % 72,41 % 17,81 % 1,86 % 
1998 7,28 % 71,96 % 18,39 % 2,37 % 
1999 7,01 % 72,30 % 18,71 % 1,98 % 
2000 7,21 % 72,31 % 18,17 % 2,30 % 
2001 7,38 % 72,41 % 18,30 % 1,90 % 
2002 7,28 % 71,89 % 18,56 % 2,27 % 
2003 6,77 % 71,70 % 19,13 % 2,40 % 
2004 7,52 % 70,34 % 19,33 % 2,81 % 
TI        
1996 7,76 % 70,80 % 18,50 % 2,94 % 
1997 7,73 % 71,32 % 17,90 % 3,05 % 
1998 7,10 % 70,96 % 18,54 % 3,40 % 
1999 6,82 % 71,34 % 18,84 % 3,01 % 
2000 7,05 % 71,43 % 18,24 % 3,28 % 
2001 7,19 % 71,47 % 18,43 % 2,91 % 
2002 7,11 % 71,00 % 18,69 % 3,21 % 
2003 6,61 % 70,83 % 19,31 % 3,25 % 
2004 7,32 % 69,40 % 19,54 % 3,74 % 
ATI        
1996 7,25 % 68,31 % 20,86 % 3,58 % 
1997 7,11 % 68,88 % 20,32 % 3,69 % 
1998 6,50 % 68,50 % 21,01 % 3,99 % 
1999 6,33 % 68,88 % 21,16 % 3,63 % 
2000 6,49 % 69,02 % 20,50 % 4,00 % 
2001 6,50 % 69,11 % 20,79 % 3,60 % 
2002 6,49 % 68,79 % 20,79 % 3,94 % 
2003 6,10 % 68,59 % 21,48 % 3,82 % 
2004 6,75 % 66,98 % 21,68 % 4,59 % 
TILC = TI - CI        
1996 7,50 % 72,07 % 17,57 % 2,85 % 
1997 7,61 % 71,97 % 17,46 % 2,96 % 
1998 6,95 % 71,88 % 17,98 % 3,19 % 
1999 6,45 % 72,53 % 18,07 % 2,96 % 
2000 6,81 % 72,00 % 18,21 % 2,99 % 
2001 7,02 % 72,25 % 17,91 % 2,82 % 
2002 6,97 % 71,87 % 18,47 % 2,68 % 
2003 6,47 % 71,68 % 19,15 % 2,70 % 
2004 6,74 % 70,69 % 19,84 % 2,74 % 
 







Table A-6. Decomposition of Gini coefficient by income source 
          
 Share 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WI  0,6477 0,6564 0,6648 0,6617 0,6430 0,6709 0,6483 0,6412 0,6342 
SI  0,0708 0,0704 0,0698 0,0629 0,0658 0,0664 0,0651 0,0572 0,0605 
SD  0,0189 0,0196 0,0243 0,0239 0,0339 0,0146 0,0452 0,0559 0,0614 
CLSD  0,0435 0,0403 0,0297 0,0417 0,0507 0,0364 0,0301 0,0286 0,0239 
TT  0,1781 0,1726 0,1728 0,1719 0,1704 0,1745 0,1766 0,1836 0,1841 
TFT  0,0410 0,0406 0,0387 0,0378 0,0362 0,0372 0,0347 0,0335 0,0359 
          
 Absolute coefficient of concentration  
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WI  0,4837 0,4793 0,4640 0,4635 0,4645 0,4559 0,4564 0,4638 0,4600 
SI  0,5994 0,6555 0,6503 0,6356 0,6627 0,6533 0,6802 0,6531 0,6447 
SD  0,9433 0,9331 0,9280 0,9376 0,9540 0,8486 0,9408 0,9521 0,9598 
CLSD  0,6726 0,6868 0,6654 0,6030 0,6529 0,7094 0,7838 0,7649 0,9341 
TT  -0,1045 -0,1178 -0,1341 -0,1242 -0,1362 -0,1433 -0,1343 -0,1233 -0,1221 
TFT  -0,0627 -0,1049 -0,1037 -0,1068 -0,1079 -0,1334 -0,1339 -0,1233 -0,1263 
          
 Absolute contribution 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WI  0,3133 0,3146 0,3085 0,3067 0,2987 0,3059 0,2959 0,2974 0,2917 
SI  0,0424 0,0462 0,0454 0,0400 0,0436 0,0434 0,0443 0,0373 0,0390 
SD  0,0178 0,0183 0,0225 0,0224 0,0324 0,0124 0,0425 0,0533 0,0589 
CLSD  0,0293 0,0277 0,0197 0,0252 0,0331 0,0258 0,0236 0,0219 0,0223 
TT  -0,0186 -0,0203 -0,0232 -0,0214 -0,0232 -0,0250 -0,0237 -0,0226 -0,0225 
TFT  -0,0026 -0,0043 -0,0040 -0,0040 -0,0039 -0,0050 -0,0046 -0,0041 -0,0045 
          
 Relative contribution 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WI  0,8209 0,8232 0,8361 0,8315 0,7847 0,8557 0,7831 0,7762 0,7578 
SI  0,1112 0,1208 0,1230 0,1084 0,1145 0,1213 0,1172 0,0975 0,1013 
SD  0,0467 0,0479 0,0610 0,0607 0,0851 0,0346 0,1124 0,1390 0,1531 
CLSD  0,0767 0,0725 0,0535 0,0682 0,0870 0,0722 0,0624 0,0572 0,0579 
TT  -0,0488 -0,0532 -0,0628 -0,0579 -0,0610 -0,0700 -0,0628 -0,0591 -0,0584 
TFT  -0,0067 -0,0112 -0,0109 -0,0109 -0,0103 -0,0139 -0,0123 -0,0108 -0,0118 
          
 Relative coefficient of concentration 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WI  1,2675 1,2541 1,2577 1,2565 1,2203 1,2754 1,2078 1,2106 1,1950 
SI  1,5706 1,7152 1,7627 1,7229 1,7411 1,8275 1,8004 1,7046 1,6749 
SD  2,4716 2,4416 2,5154 2,5417 2,5065 2,3738 2,4899 2,4848 2,4935 
CLSD  1,7625 1,7972 1,8035 1,6345 1,7154 1,9846 2,0745 1,9964 2,4265 
TT  -0,2738 -0,3083 -0,3635 -0,3368 -0,3578 -0,4010 -0,3555 -0,3218 -0,3173 
TFT  -0,1643 -0,2746 -0,2812 -0,2894 -0,2835 -0,3731 -0,3545 -0,3218 -0,3282 
 




Table A-7. Decomposition of SCV by income source 
 Absolute contribution 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
WI  0,5136 0,4595 0,4070 0,4138 0,4359 0,4156 0,4458 0,3971 0,4148
  (0,084) (0,024) (0,015) (0,021) (0,021) (0,018) (0,036) (0,013) (0,030)
SI  0,1581 0,3715 0,1919 0,1484 0,1766 0,1645 0,1516 0,1495 0,2093
  (0,051) (0,137) (0,050) (0,020) (0,025) (0,029) (0,016) (0,029) (0,068)
SD  0,3356 0,2714 0,2722 0,3028 0,6314 0,1194 1,1708 0,7283 4,8617
  (0,134) (0,080) (0,054) (0,111) (0,174) (0,042) (0,384) (0,122) (2,248)
CLSD  0,7178 0,6928 0,1424 0,2461 0,4085 0,2659 0,2222 0,2333 0,2087
  (0,394) (0,260) (0,038) (0,077) (0,110) (0,109) (0,043) (0,075) (0,057)
TT  -0,0151 -0,0210 -0,0229 -0,0172 -0,0260 -0,0217 -0,0281 -0,0236 -0,0111
  (0,004) (0,004) (0,002) (0,005) (0,003) (0,004) (0,002) (0,003) (0,011)
TFT  -0,0047 -0,0060 -0,0049 -0,0058 -0,0059 -0,0061 -0,0067 -0,0061 -0,0060
  (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001)
          
 Relative contribution 
Source  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
WI  0,3012 0,2599 0,4129 0,3803 0,2690 0,4433 0,2280 0,2686 0,0731
  (0,082) (0,046) (0,036) (0,046) (0,036) (0,061) (0,047) (0,030) (0,029)
SI  0,0927 0,2101 0,1946 0,1364 0,1090 0,1755 0,0775 0,1011 0,0369
  (0,037) (0,070) (0,045) (0,025) (0,021) (0,036) (0,017) (0,018) (0,017)
SD  0,1968 0,1535 0,2761 0,2782 0,3896 0,1273 0,5987 0,4926 0,8563
  (0,078) (0,042) (0,041) (0,073) (0,068) (0,040) (0,080) (0,044) (0,051)
CLSD  0,4209 0,3918 0,1445 0,2262 0,2521 0,2836 0,1136 0,1578 0,0368
  (0,140) (0,094) (0,034) (0,059) (0,054) (0,083) (0,028) (0,044) (0,012)
TT  -0,0089 -0,0118 -0,0232 -0,0158 -0,0160 -0,0231 -0,0144 -0,0159 -0,0020
  (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,005) (0,003) (0,007) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002)
TFT  -0,0028 -0,0034 -0,0050 -0,0053 -0,0036 -0,0065 -0,0034 -0,0041 -0,0011
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000)
 













Table A-8. Distribution of main income components, by decile, top 5% and top 1% 
decile top 
% share 1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 10 5 % 1 % 
WI              
1996 1,07 % 1,42 % 5,75 % 16,29 % 29,45 % 18,90 % 27,12 % 15,73 % 3,75 %
1997 1,08 % 1,51 % 5,88 % 16,24 % 29,58 % 18,85 % 26,86 % 15,71 % 3,72 %
1998 1,30 % 1,86 % 6,22 % 16,71 % 29,25 % 18,40 % 26,27 % 15,03 % 3,44 %
1999 1,31 % 1,91 % 6,40 % 16,50 % 29,18 % 18,16 % 26,55 % 15,33 % 3,38 %
2000 1,12 % 1,76 % 6,62 % 16,99 % 28,46 % 18,38 % 26,68 % 15,52 % 3,58 %
2001 1,32 % 1,99 % 6,72 % 17,20 % 28,34 % 18,14 % 26,29 % 15,29 % 3,66 %
2002 1,37 % 1,99 % 6,51 % 17,26 % 28,40 % 18,21 % 26,26 % 14,99 % 3,22 %
2003 1,40 % 2,01 % 6,25 % 16,71 % 27,98 % 18,61 % 27,04 % 15,25 % 2,81 %
2004 1,37 % 1,88 % 6,60 % 17,00 % 28,18 % 18,42 % 26,55 % 15,33 % 3,17 %
SI              
1996 0,11 % 1,75 % 8,47 % 12,34 % 17,23 % 12,08 % 48,03 % 35,77 % 16,61 %
1997 0,17 % 0,95 % 7,05 % 12,19 % 14,10 % 12,94 % 52,60 % 40,89 % 22,65 %
1998 0,33 % 1,53 % 5,89 % 11,75 % 14,39 % 12,92 % 53,18 % 42,01 % 19,60 %
1999 -0,47 % 2,38 % 7,23 % 11,71 % 14,21 % 13,87 % 51,05 % 40,73 % 18,98 %
2000 0,20 % 1,84 % 5,29 % 10,18 % 15,79 % 13,31 % 53,39 % 41,14 % 17,88 %
2001 0,69 % 2,18 % 6,30 % 9,38 % 14,55 % 11,81 % 55,09 % 43,34 % 22,34 %
2002 -0,31 % 1,37 % 5,73 % 9,74 % 13,86 % 14,29 % 55,33 % 42,67 % 19,56 %
2003 -0,19 % 1,94 % 7,62 % 9,99 % 14,64 % 14,20 % 51,80 % 40,57 % 17,12 %
2004 -0,23 % 2,38 % 7,15 % 11,25 % 15,59 % 12,48 % 51,39 % 39,89 % 17,05 %
SD              
1996 0,14 % 0,14 % 0,59 % 0,81 % 1,67 % 2,71 % 93,95 % 91,07 % 77,26 %
1997 0,40 % 0,37 % 0,55 % 0,93 % 1,67 % 2,46 % 93,62 % 90,11 % 77,04 %
1998 0,24 % 0,34 % 0,73 % 1,34 % 1,83 % 2,20 % 93,32 % 89,48 % 78,54 %
1999 0,23 % 0,19 % 0,27 % 1,48 % 1,30 % 1,85 % 94,68 % 90,38 % 76,43 %
2000 0,08 % 0,09 % 0,39 % 0,68 % 1,45 % 1,45 % 95,87 % 93,96 % 81,77 %
2001 2,46 % 0,93 % 1,55 % 2,14 % 3,71 % 3,72 % 85,47 % 79,30 % 60,47 %
2002 1,55 % 0,11 % 0,36 % 0,64 % 0,99 % 1,32 % 95,03 % 93,14 % 84,76 %
2003 0,48 % 0,09 % 0,30 % 0,54 % 0,92 % 1,69 % 95,98 % 94,15 % 82,86 %
2004 0,36 % 0,12 % 0,32 % 0,35 % 0,74 % 1,19 % 96,90 % 95,15 % 84,58 %
CLSD              
1996 -0,60 % 2,86 % 8,82 % 8,61 % 10,39 % 7,07 % 62,85 % 57,36 % 46,44 %
1997 -0,56 % 3,31 % 7,85 % 7,74 % 9,28 % 6,47 % 65,91 % 57,92 % 44,63 %
1998 -7,25 % 4,31 % 11,18 % 13,23 % 12,59 % 9,89 % 56,06 % 48,26 % 31,93 %
1999 0,12 % 3,48 % 9,71 % 10,82 % 10,51 % 7,61 % 57,74 % 51,70 % 36,87 %
2000 0,91 % 2,90 % 7,76 % 8,40 % 9,73 % 7,20 % 63,09 % 57,20 % 43,30 %
2001 -9,87 % 4,08 % 12,03 % 13,39 % 13,26 % 10,18 % 56,92 % 49,26 % 35,35 %
2002 -15,97 % 4,15 % 12,31 % 12,71 % 15,69 % 10,59 % 60,52 % 52,80 % 35,95 %
2003 -10,03 % 3,85 % 10,86 % 10,55 % 13,45 % 9,59 % 61,72 % 55,84 % 38,19 %
2004 -12,21 % 2,08 % 6,58 % 7,51 % 11,66 % 7,29 % 77,10 % 67,49 % 45,31 %
 








Table A-8. Distribution of main income components, by decile, top 5% and top 1%  (cont.) 
decile top 
% share 1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 10 5 % 1 % 
WSI = WI + SI            
1996 0,97 % 1,45 % 6,02 % 15,90 % 28,25 % 18,23 % 29,18 % 17,70 % 5,02 %
1997 0,99 % 1,46 % 5,99 % 15,84 % 28,08 % 18,28 % 29,35 % 18,15 % 5,55 %
1998 1,21 % 1,83 % 6,18 % 16,24 % 27,84 % 17,88 % 28,83 % 17,60 % 4,97 %
1999 1,15 % 1,95 % 6,48 % 16,08 % 27,88 % 17,78 % 28,68 % 17,53 % 4,73 %
2000 1,03 % 1,76 % 6,50 % 16,35 % 27,28 % 17,91 % 29,16 % 17,89 % 4,91 %
2001 1,26 % 2,01 % 6,68 % 16,49 % 27,10 % 17,57 % 28,88 % 17,82 % 5,34 %
2002 1,22 % 1,93 % 6,44 % 16,57 % 27,07 % 17,85 % 28,91 % 17,52 % 4,71 %
2003 1,27 % 2,00 % 6,36 % 16,16 % 26,88 % 18,25 % 29,07 % 17,32 % 3,98 %
2004 1,23 % 1,92 % 6,65 % 16,49 % 27,09 % 17,90 % 28,72 % 17,47 % 4,38 %
CI = SD + CLSD            
1996 -0,38 % 2,04 % 6,33 % 6,25 % 7,75 % 5,75 % 72,26 % 67,56 % 55,77 %
1997 -0,24 % 2,34 % 5,46 % 5,51 % 6,79 % 5,16 % 74,98 % 68,45 % 55,23 %
1998 -3,89 % 2,52 % 6,48 % 7,88 % 7,75 % 6,43 % 72,82 % 66,80 % 52,89 %
1999 0,16 % 2,28 % 6,27 % 7,42 % 7,16 % 5,51 % 71,18 % 65,79 % 51,27 %
2000 0,58 % 1,78 % 4,81 % 5,30 % 6,41 % 4,89 % 76,24 % 71,94 % 58,73 %
2001 -6,34 % 3,18 % 9,03 % 10,17 % 10,52 % 8,33 % 65,10 % 57,86 % 42,54 %
2002 -5,46 % 1,72 % 5,13 % 5,47 % 6,86 % 5,02 % 81,24 % 77,01 % 65,24 %
2003 -3,08 % 1,36 % 3,87 % 3,93 % 5,17 % 4,37 % 84,38 % 81,18 % 67,73 %
2004 -3,16 % 0,67 % 2,07 % 2,36 % 3,80 % 2,90 % 91,36 % 87,41 % 73,59 %
TT              
1996 0,96 % 11,60 % 32,66 % 28,42 % 13,70 % 6,11 % 6,54 % 3,69 % 1,31 %
1997 1,47 % 11,33 % 33,79 % 28,12 % 13,45 % 5,45 % 6,39 % 3,37 % 0,88 %
1998 2,17 % 11,19 % 34,76 % 27,39 % 12,55 % 5,60 % 6,35 % 3,65 % 0,84 %
1999 2,32 % 11,12 % 33,92 % 27,73 % 11,95 % 5,88 % 7,08 % 4,01 % 1,37 %
2000 2,74 % 11,72 % 34,04 % 26,62 % 13,51 % 5,12 % 6,26 % 3,57 % 0,99 %
2001 3,19 % 11,49 % 34,40 % 25,97 % 13,75 % 5,63 % 5,58 % 2,67 % 0,86 %
2002 3,10 % 11,34 % 34,43 % 25,60 % 14,28 % 5,55 % 5,69 % 3,07 % 0,68 %
2003 2,17 % 10,93 % 34,05 % 26,73 % 15,31 % 5,17 % 5,64 % 3,10 % 0,83 %
2004 2,23 % 11,40 % 33,70 % 26,72 % 14,32 % 5,57 % 6,06 % 2,84 % 1,12 %
TFT              
1996 10,07 % 7,65 % 19,79 % 20,70 % 20,09 % 11,80 % 9,90 % 3,70 % 0,55 %
1997 10,31 % 9,74 % 20,44 % 21,10 % 18,53 % 11,26 % 8,62 % 3,30 % 0,90 %
1998 11,28 % 10,13 % 19,77 % 19,57 % 19,17 % 10,97 % 9,12 % 3,45 % 0,53 %
1999 10,98 % 10,86 % 19,90 % 18,33 % 18,74 % 12,23 % 8,96 % 2,55 % 0,24 %
2000 10,94 % 9,92 % 20,25 % 19,82 % 19,31 % 11,21 % 8,54 % 2,60 % 0,38 %
2001 10,87 % 10,33 % 21,30 % 20,39 % 18,57 % 10,75 % 7,78 % 2,58 % 0,39 %
2002 10,67 % 10,61 % 21,16 % 20,82 % 18,94 % 10,75 % 7,05 % 1,86 % 0,20 %
2003 10,85 % 10,62 % 20,79 % 19,88 % 19,39 % 10,56 % 7,92 % 2,43 % 0,20 %
2004 11,91 % 10,16 % 20,23 % 17,44 % 20,28 % 12,27 % 7,70 % 2,34 % 0,69 %
 







Table A-9. Distribution of main income components, by occupation group 
   occupational status 
 % share self-employed employees pensioners other 
          
WI 1996 0,72 % 96,57 % 0,90 % 1,81 % 
 1997 0,62 % 96,44 % 0,98 % 1,97 % 
 1998 0,58 % 96,17 % 1,08 % 2,17 % 
 1999 0,64 % 96,12 % 1,10 % 2,14 % 
 2000 0,63 % 96,07 % 1,22 % 2,09 % 
 2001 0,66 % 96,06 % 1,20 % 2,08 % 
 2002 0,63 % 96,19 % 1,23 % 1,95 % 
 2003 0,70 % 95,97 % 1,24 % 2,09 % 
 2004 0,69 % 95,89 % 1,40 % 2,01 % 
          
SI 1996 88,41 % 8,31 % 1,79 % 1,49 % 
 1997 92,14 % 5,78 % 1,00 % 1,08 % 
 1998 85,32 % 7,65 % 2,27 % 4,77 % 
 1999 85,59 % 9,20 % 3,05 % 2,16 % 
 2000 85,37 % 8,81 % 2,46 % 3,36 % 
 2001 90,22 % 6,94 % 1,63 % 1,21 % 
 2002 89,18 % 8,08 % 1,75 % 0,99 % 
 2003 92,17 % 5,01 % 1,55 % 1,27 % 
 2004 90,80 % 5,98 % 1,49 % 1,72 % 
          
CI 1996 11,62 % 51,68 % 32,50 % 4,20 % 
 1997 9,63 % 61,13 % 24,77 % 4,47 % 
 1998 9,60 % 54,85 % 28,39 % 7,17 % 
 1999 12,06 % 54,42 % 29,78 % 3,74 % 
 2000 9,67 % 65,22 % 18,62 % 6,48 % 
 2001 10,39 % 56,86 % 28,19 % 4,57 % 
 2002 8,80 % 60,19 % 21,32 % 9,69 % 
 2003 8,16 % 61,57 % 21,08 % 9,20 % 
 2004 13,58 % 55,59 % 16,32 % 14,51 % 
          
TT 1996 0,98 % 13,72 % 84,29 % 1,00 % 
 1997 0,73 % 12,14 % 86,26 % 0,88 % 
 1998 0,81 % 10,16 % 88,37 % 0,66 % 
 1999 0,81 % 10,54 % 88,03 % 0,63 % 
 2000 0,67 % 10,72 % 87,98 % 0,64 % 
 2001 0,84 % 10,92 % 87,53 % 0,72 % 
 2002 0,84 % 11,19 % 87,22 % 0,75 % 
 2003 0,74 % 12,33 % 86,23 % 0,69 % 
 2004 0,87 % 10,30 % 88,33 % 0,50 % 
          
TFT 1996 3,25 % 48,61 % 18,41 % 29,72 % 
 1997 3,26 % 45,70 % 19,95 % 31,10 % 
 1998 2,50 % 46,16 % 22,29 % 29,04 % 
 1999 2,00 % 46,81 % 21,98 % 29,20 % 
 2000 2,75 % 47,79 % 20,08 % 29,38 % 
 2001 2,12 % 47,21 % 21,71 % 28,96 % 
 2002 2,39 % 46,06 % 22,15 % 29,41 % 
 2003 2,09 % 45,70 % 24,46 % 27,75 % 
 2004 1,94 % 44,33 % 24,98 % 28,75 % 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Income Distribution Survey data 
  
58 
Table A-10. Distribution of main income components, by age groups 
age_group 
% share 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-66 67-79 80+ 
WI           
1996 6,97 % 25,72 % 28,29 % 26,43 % 11,97 % 0,60 % 0,01 %
1997 6,77 % 26,10 % 27,13 % 26,83 % 12,56 % 0,60 % 0,02 %
1998 6,85 % 26,08 % 27,56 % 26,43 % 12,56 % 0,50 % 0,02 %
1999 6,66 % 26,33 % 27,20 % 26,25 % 13,08 % 0,46 % 0,02 %
2000 6,82 % 25,71 % 27,72 % 25,28 % 14,00 % 0,46 % 0,01 %
2001 6,60 % 25,42 % 27,47 % 25,34 % 14,60 % 0,57 % 0,01 %
2002 6,30 % 23,73 % 28,04 % 25,61 % 15,73 % 0,58 % 0,01 %
2003 5,94 % 22,74 % 28,42 % 25,73 % 16,63 % 0,51 % 0,01 %
2004 5,82 % 21,79 % 28,51 % 26,02 % 17,19 % 0,65 % 0,02 %
SI           
1996 2,12 % 15,24 % 31,69 % 30,14 % 17,15 % 3,44 % 0,21 %
1997 1,23 % 13,40 % 32,29 % 31,15 % 19,57 % 2,36 % 0,01 %
1998 1,62 % 13,77 % 31,28 % 30,98 % 19,69 % 2,36 % 0,29 %
1999 1,43 % 11,71 % 25,98 % 36,60 % 21,15 % 3,03 % 0,11 %
2000 1,49 % 13,58 % 31,17 % 31,63 % 19,18 % 3,01 % -0,08 %
2001 1,12 % 11,96 % 28,10 % 35,05 % 21,25 % 2,44 % 0,08 %
2002 1,21 % 11,35 % 26,64 % 35,21 % 23,40 % 2,04 % 0,15 %
2003 0,92 % 14,56 % 27,67 % 32,89 % 21,76 % 2,12 % 0,09 %
2004 0,74 % 12,00 % 27,76 % 33,17 % 23,83 % 2,43 % 0,06 %
CI           
1996 0,93 % 10,23 % 21,82 % 22,09 % 24,00 % 16,63 % 4,30 %
1997 1,24 % 12,64 % 19,94 % 24,85 % 24,78 % 13,26 % 3,30 %
1998 2,15 % 6,82 % 16,78 % 29,79 % 22,96 % 15,15 % 6,35 %
1999 1,85 % 9,24 % 18,02 % 24,52 % 24,13 % 16,70 % 5,54 %
2000 1,15 % 8,85 % 19,24 % 31,87 % 24,28 % 11,29 % 3,32 %
2001 1,76 % 12,75 % 12,73 % 26,87 % 24,38 % 15,75 % 5,76 %
2002 0,97 % 5,95 % 12,81 % 36,40 % 27,91 % 11,38 % 4,58 %
2003 1,46 % 6,01 % 19,56 % 27,67 % 28,78 % 13,51 % 3,01 %
2004 1,01 % 12,22 % 24,79 % 19,97 % 24,34 % 14,69 % 2,99 %
TT           
1996 2,34 % 7,38 % 7,20 % 8,43 % 18,33 % 41,97 % 14,35 %
1997 2,06 % 6,92 % 6,86 % 8,37 % 18,32 % 42,51 % 14,96 %
1998 1,87 % 6,08 % 7,20 % 8,44 % 18,66 % 41,84 % 15,91 %
1999 1,45 % 5,86 % 7,10 % 9,19 % 18,66 % 41,87 % 15,86 %
2000 1,61 % 6,27 % 7,66 % 8,81 % 19,56 % 39,80 % 16,29 %
2001 1,51 % 6,08 % 7,97 % 9,03 % 21,12 % 38,98 % 15,31 %
2002 1,71 % 6,35 % 8,41 % 9,48 % 21,41 % 37,24 % 15,41 %
2003 1,82 % 6,76 % 8,83 % 9,84 % 21,78 % 36,32 % 14,65 %
2004 1,59 % 5,71 % 8,45 % 8,89 % 22,91 % 36,81 % 15,64 %
 







Appendix B: Complementary data sources 
 
Table B-1. World Bank’s estimates of inequality levels: income and expenditure 
 
Source: Brandolini and Smeeding (2007) 
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Table B-2. Selected measures of household income dispersion in USA, 1986-2005 
 
 





Table B-2. Selected measures of household income dispersion in USA, 1986-2005 (cont.) 
 
 



















Table B-4. Trends in real household equivalent income at different quintiles 
 



















Table B-5. Gini indices of market income and disposable income in 16 countries (per cent) 
 























Source: OECD (Förster and d’Ercole, 2005) 
  
